DL v. District of Columbia

Majority - Circuit Judge Tatel

Yes, the case is not moot, and the district court's class certification and comprehensive injunctive relief were proper. The court first addressed mootness, affirming that the case remains justiciable under the "relation back" exception established in United States Parole Commission v. Geraghty. The named plaintiffs' individual claims for injunctive relief became moot only because the district court initially made an error by certifying an overly broad class, which this court later corrected on appeal. The court clarified that Geraghty applies whether a court erroneously denies class certification or erroneously certifies an overly broad class, as the essential point is that the court's error prevented the class from gaining independent legal status under Rule 23 while the named plaintiffs' claims were live. This case was distinguished from Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, which involved FLSA collective actions that do not create the same independent legal status as Rule 23 class actions. Next, the court affirmed the district court's certification of the four narrower subclasses under Rule 23(b)(2), finding no abuse of discretion. These subclasses were defined by reference to specific, uniform failures in the special education process: failure to identify children, failure to provide timely eligibility determinations, and failure to ensure a smooth transition. This precise definition resolved the commonality issue identified in the prior appeal, as each subclass now represented "common harms" susceptible to common proof and remediable by a "single injunction." The court distinguished Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes by noting that IDEA liability, unlike Title VII employment discrimination claims, does not depend on individualized reasons for the defendant's failure; rather, plaintiffs need only demonstrate that the District in fact failed to meet its statutory obligations. The court also found no error in the district court’s findings on typicality and adequacy of representation, noting that the named plaintiffs, despite their individual claims becoming moot, demonstrated a strong commitment to the class, which is consistent with Geraghty. Certification under Rule 23(b)(2) was appropriate because the systemic nature of the violations demanded class-wide injunctive relief, making it a suitable tool for civil rights cases addressing systemic harms. Finally, the court upheld the injunction against the District, rejecting all challenges to its legal basis and evidentiary support. Regarding legal interpretations, the court affirmed the requirement for eligibility determinations within 120 days of referral, aligning with District of Columbia law which exercised the IDEA's option to set a timeframe. It also affirmed the requirement for special education services to be implemented by a child's third birthday for smooth transitions, directly citing IDEA statutory text and related regulations. On evidentiary grounds, the court found no clear error in the district court’s factual findings or abuse of discretion in the remedy. The 8.5% enrollment target for identification was well-supported by expert testimony and D.C.'s risk factors, and using enrollment data as a proxy for identification was reasonable, as the District itself used this method. The programmatic remedies were justified by ongoing deficiencies. The court also affirmed the use of statistical evidence for proving systemic violations, clarifying that a failure to identify disabled children is a substantive denial of a FAPE, not merely a procedural harm. The court concluded that the injunction was not overly intrusive, as it balanced the need for relief with deference to administrators through gradual deadlines, and that IDEA's remedial provision (authorizing "appropriate" relief) granted courts broad authority to impose comprehensive, structural injunctions to remedy systemic Child Find violations, consistent with the Act's purpose.