Dixon v. United States
548 U.S. 1, 126 S.Ct. 2437, 165 L.Ed.2d 299 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
In a federal criminal prosecution, a defendant who raises the affirmative defense of duress bears the burden of proving the elements of that defense by a preponderance of the evidence.
Facts:
- Keshia Dixon's boyfriend threatened to kill her or harm her daughters if she refused to purchase firearms for him.
- In January 2003, acting under these threats, Dixon attended two gun shows to acquire multiple firearms for her boyfriend.
- At the time of the purchases, Dixon was under indictment for a felony.
- During the transactions, Dixon provided a false address on the required forms.
- Dixon also falsely stated on the forms that she was not under indictment for a felony.
Procedural Posture:
- Keshia Dixon was indicted in federal district court for violations of federal firearms laws.
- At her trial in the U.S. District Court, Dixon raised the affirmative defense of duress.
- The trial judge instructed the jury that Dixon bore the burden of proving duress by a preponderance of the evidence.
- The jury convicted Dixon on all counts.
- Dixon, as appellant, appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, arguing the jury instruction was erroneous.
- The Fifth Circuit (appellee being the United States) affirmed the conviction.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Dixon's petition for a writ of certiorari to resolve a circuit split on the issue.
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Issue:
In a federal criminal prosecution, does the Constitution or federal common law require the government to bear the burden of disproving a defendant's affirmative defense of duress beyond a reasonable doubt?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Stevens
No. Neither the Due Process Clause nor federal common law requires the government to disprove a defendant's duress defense beyond a reasonable doubt; rather, the burden of persuasion rests with the defendant to prove duress by a preponderance of the evidence. The defense of duress does not negate the mens rea element of the firearms offenses, as Dixon admitted she knowingly made false statements and knew her conduct was illegal. Duress serves as an excuse for otherwise criminal conduct, not as a challenge to the elements of the crime itself, so shifting the burden of proof to the defendant does not violate due process. Furthermore, the long-standing common-law rule placed the burden of proving affirmative defenses on the defendant. As Congress was silent on the duress defense when enacting the relevant firearms statutes, the Court presumes it intended to adhere to this traditional common-law allocation of the burden.
Concurring - Justice Kennedy
No. The court correctly concluded that the burden of proof rests with the defendant. When a statute is silent, courts should apply ordinary default rules for allocating burdens. The facts required to establish duress, such as the nature of the threats and the defendant's state of mind, lie 'peculiarly in the knowledge of the defendant.' It would be impractical and often impossible for the prosecution to disprove a defendant's private allegations of coercion. Therefore, placing the burden of production and persuasion on the party raising the defense aligns with principles of fairness and practicality.
Concurring - Justice Alito
No. The common law has historically placed the burden of proving duress on the defendant, and this rule should apply uniformly to all federal criminal statutes unless Congress explicitly directs otherwise. It is unrealistic to assume Congress implicitly makes a new judgment about the burden of proof every time it enacts a criminal statute. Adopting a statute-by-statute approach would lead to confusion and inconsistency, potentially requiring different jury instructions for different counts within the same trial. The judiciary should not assume Congress delegated it the authority to make this policy choice.
Dissenting - Justice Breyer
Yes. In the absence of congressional guidance, the court should have held that the prosecution must bear the burden of disproving duress beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority’s approach of freezing the common law at the time a statute was enacted creates unnecessary complexity and inconsistency. A uniform federal rule should be developed through reason and experience, which would place the burden on the prosecution, consistent with the treatment of similar defenses like self-defense and entrapment. The duress defense, while not negating mens rea, involves a lack of free will that is fundamentally at odds with criminal culpability, making it fair to require the government to disprove it as it does other core aspects of a criminal case.
Analysis:
This decision resolves a circuit split and establishes a clear default rule for the affirmative defense of duress in federal criminal law, placing the burden of proof squarely on the defendant. By distinguishing duress from defenses that negate an element of the offense, the Court reinforces the principle that the government's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt applies only to the statutory elements of the crime. This ruling makes it significantly more challenging for federal defendants to succeed on a duress defense and signals the Court's deference to long-standing common law principles and legislative silence in the face of calls to modernize or unify rules for affirmative defenses.
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