Dixon v. Superior Court
94 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 9126, 30 Cal. App. 4th 733, 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 687 (1994)
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Rule of Law:
Statements made during a statutorily mandated public comment period concerning a public issue are absolutely privileged under California's anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16), and the speaker's potential malice or motive is irrelevant.
Facts:
- A 22-acre portion of the California State University at Long Beach (CSULB) campus, known as Puvunga, is a registered national historic site considered sacred by many Native Americans.
- Keith Dixon, an archaeology professor emeritus, had previously criticized a 1980 archaeological report on the site prepared by Scientific Resource Surveys, Inc. (SRS) as 'poorly done' and biased.
- In 1992, CSULB proposed building a strip mall on the Puvunga site and commissioned an environmental study under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA).
- In December 1992, the study recommended adopting a 'negative declaration,' finding the project would have no significant impact, which initiated a public comment period.
- Between January and May 1993, Dixon wrote a series of letters to CSULB officials challenging the negative declaration's findings and harshly criticizing SRS's past work on the site as 'highly flawed,' biased, and unprofessional.
- In his letters, Dixon recommended that SRS be required to correct its past reports before being considered for future work.
- As a result of Dixon's outspoken opposition, CSULB asked SRS not to bid on a new contract related to the Puvunga site.
Procedural Posture:
- Scientific Resource Surveys, Inc. (SRS) filed a lawsuit against Keith Dixon in California superior court, alleging intentional interference with contractual relations, libel, slander, and other torts.
- Dixon filed a special motion to strike the complaint under Code of Civil Procedure § 425.16, characterizing the lawsuit as a SLAPP suit.
- The trial court denied Dixon's motion to strike.
- Dixon (petitioner) then filed a petition for a writ of mandate with the California Court of Appeal, asking it to direct the trial court to grant his motion.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's allegedly malicious motive for making critical statements during a CEQA public review process defeat the protection of California's anti-SLAPP statute, thereby allowing a plaintiff to establish a probability of prevailing on a defamation or business tort claim?
Opinions:
Majority - Wallin, J.
No. A defendant's allegedly malicious motive does not defeat the protection of the anti-SLAPP statute when the statements are made during a statutorily invited public comment period. The court held that Dixon made a prima facie showing that the lawsuit arose from his exercise of free speech in connection with a public issue. The proposed development and the related CEQA proceedings were matters of public concern, and Dixon's letters were written during the public review period initiated by the proposed negative declaration. The burden therefore shifted to the plaintiff, SRS, to establish a probability of prevailing on its claim. SRS argued it could show Dixon acted with malice, which under U.S. Supreme Court precedent in McDonald v. Smith, would defeat a First Amendment defense. However, the court distinguished McDonald and instead followed Matossian v. Fahmie, which held that where a statute, like CEQA, expressly invites public comment on a governmental action, the statements made are absolutely privileged. This absolute privilege means the court will not inquire into the speaker's purpose or motivation. Therefore, even if SRS could prove Dixon's statements were malicious, SRS could not prevail on its claim as a matter of law because Dixon's speech was absolutely immune.
Analysis:
This case significantly strengthens California's anti-SLAPP statute by clarifying that speech made within a formal, statutorily-defined public participation process is absolutely privileged, rendering the speaker's motive irrelevant. By immunizing participants from inquiry into their alleged malice, the decision provides robust protection for individuals and groups who speak out on public issues, particularly in environmental and land-use disputes governed by processes like CEQA. This precedent makes it much harder for plaintiffs in SLAPP suits to meet their burden of showing a probability of prevailing, thereby fulfilling the legislative intent to prevent lawsuits designed to chill public discourse and participation in government.
