DIV. OF WORKERS'COMP, ETC. v. Brevda
420 So.2d 887 (1982)
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Rule of Law:
A statutory right to attorney's fees is a procedural right, not a substantive one, and does not vest until a judgment awarding them is entered; therefore, the repeal of a fee-authorizing statute before judgment extinguishes the right, even if the cause of action arose while the statute was effective. Additionally, a statute compensating crime victims for 'personal physical injury' can be interpreted to include necessary psychiatric treatment resulting from that physical injury.
Facts:
- Yale Brevda, the owner of a business that designed and installed audio systems, was the victim of a criminal assault on October 13, 1979.
- As a direct result of the physical injury from the assault, Brevda's business income dropped from $21,000 in the prior fiscal year to $3,000 in the year of the injury.
- Brevda also incurred out-of-pocket medical expenses for his injuries.
- A neurologist and psychiatrist diagnosed Brevda as suffering from nervous tension and memory disorders resulting from a combination of physical and psychiatric problems caused by the assault.
- At the time of Brevda's injury, a Florida statute (Section 960.19) authorized the award of attorney's fees in crimes compensation cases.
- The legislature repealed the statute authorizing attorney's fees after Brevda's injury but before a final judgment was entered in his compensation case.
Procedural Posture:
- Yale Brevda filed a claim for benefits with the Florida Bureau of Crimes Compensation.
- A deputy commissioner of the Division of Workers' Compensation conducted a hearing.
- The deputy commissioner entered an order finding that Brevda had suffered a serious financial hardship and awarded him a lump sum payment, psychiatric treatment, costs, and attorney's fees.
- The Division of Workers' Compensation, Bureau of Crimes Compensation (appellant) appealed the deputy commissioner's order to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, with Yale Brevda as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does the repeal of a statute authorizing attorney's fees extinguish a claimant's right to such fees if the injury occurred before the repeal but the fee award was not yet reduced to judgment?
Opinions:
Majority - Ervin, Judge
No. The repeal of a statute authorizing attorney's fees extinguishes a claimant's right to those fees if the right has not yet vested through a final judgment. The court reasoned that a statutory right to attorney's fees is a procedural or remedial right, not a substantive one. A right is considered vested only when it becomes an enforceable demand, such as when it is reduced to a judgment. Until then, it is merely an 'expectable interest' based on the anticipation of an existing law's continuance. The court distinguished this from workers' compensation law, where rights are considered contractual and vest at the time of injury. The Crimes Compensation Act, however, creates a gratuitous governmental assistance program, not a contractual obligation. Therefore, because the statute was repealed before a judgment awarded fees to Brevda, his right to them was extinguished. The court also affirmed the award for psychiatric treatment, holding that the statutory term 'personal physical injury' is broad enough to encompass necessary psychiatric care that results from the physical injury. The lump sum award was reversed and remanded for recalculation according to the statutory formula, and the award of costs was reversed as unauthorized.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the critical distinction between substantive, vested rights and procedural rights or remedies in the context of statutory benefits. It establishes the precedent in Florida that a statutory right to attorney's fees does not vest upon the occurrence of the underlying injury but only upon entry of a final judgment. This makes such rights vulnerable to legislative repeal mid-litigation, significantly impacting claimants' ability to recover legal expenses if the law changes. The holding contrasts the gratuitous nature of public welfare benefits with the contractual basis of workers' compensation rights, limiting the application of workers' compensation principles to other statutory schemes. The decision also broadened the scope of recovery under the Crimes Compensation Act by interpreting 'physical injury' to include resulting psychological conditions requiring treatment.
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