District Attorney's Office v. Osborne
557 U.S. ____ (2009) (2009)
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Rule of Law:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not provide a freestanding substantive right for a convicted state prisoner to obtain and test biological evidence post-conviction. State post-conviction relief procedures are constitutionally adequate to protect any state-created liberty interest in proving innocence so long as they are not fundamentally unfair.
Facts:
- On March 22, 1993, two men, Dexter Jackson and William Osborne, solicited a prostitute, K.G., in Anchorage, Alaska.
- They drove to a deserted area where they robbed, sexually assaulted, and beat K.G., with the passenger using a blue condom.
- After the assault, the passenger shot K.G. in the head and left her for dead in the snow.
- K.G. survived and reported the crime; police recovered evidence from the scene, including the blue condom containing semen.
- Jackson was later arrested and identified Osborne as his accomplice.
- An early form of DNA testing (DQ Alpha) on the semen from the condom matched Osborne's genotype, a profile shared by approximately 16% of the black population, while excluding Jackson.
- While imprisoned, Osborne confessed to the crimes in a 2004 application for parole.
Procedural Posture:
- William Osborne was convicted of kidnaping, assault, and sexual assault by an Alaska state jury.
- Osborne's conviction was affirmed on direct appeal by the Alaska Court of Appeals.
- Osborne sought post-conviction relief in Alaska state court, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and seeking DNA testing, but his petition was denied.
- The Alaska Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief.
- Osborne filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska against state officials, alleging a due process violation.
- The District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Osborne, finding a limited constitutional right to the testing.
- The State of Alaska appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment, holding that the Due Process Clause provides a post-conviction right of access to the evidence.
- The State of Alaska (petitioners) successfully petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
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Issue:
Does a convicted state prisoner have a constitutional right under the Due Process Clause to obtain post-conviction access to biological evidence for DNA testing at his own expense?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Roberts
No. A convicted state prisoner does not have a constitutional right under the Due Process Clause to obtain post-conviction access to biological evidence for DNA testing. The Court rejected the creation of a freestanding substantive due process right to DNA testing, reasoning that this is a novel area best left to state legislatures, which are actively creating procedures to handle such requests. To constitutionalize the issue would short-circuit this legislative process and force federal courts to act as policymakers. Regarding procedural due process, a convicted person has a more limited liberty interest than a defendant at trial, and the framework of Brady v. Maryland does not apply. The proper standard is whether a state's post-conviction procedures are fundamentally inadequate. Alaska's procedures for post-conviction relief, which allow for discovery and claims of actual innocence based on new evidence, are adequate on their face, and Osborne failed to properly utilize them to seek the modern DNA testing he now requests.
Concurring - Justice Alito
No. While joining the majority, this opinion argues for two independent reasons why Osborne's claim fails. First, a prisoner's claim for evidence to prove innocence lies at the core of habeas corpus, not a § 1983 civil rights action, meaning the prisoner must first exhaust all state remedies. Second, a defendant who makes a tactical decision to forgo DNA testing at trial, as Osborne's counsel did, has no constitutional right to demand such testing after conviction. Allowing this would permit defendants to 'game the system' by avoiding testing that might prove guilt at trial, only to request it later with nothing to lose.
Dissenting - Justice Souter
Yes. This dissent would not reach the broad substantive due process question, instead resolving the case on narrower procedural grounds. Alaska, having created a state-law liberty interest in proving innocence, has failed to provide an effective procedure for vindicating that right. The state's 'combination of inattentiveness and intransigence' in applying its own rules amounted to a procedural due process violation. Therefore, Osborne is entitled to relief without the need to create a new, broad constitutional right.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
Yes. The State's refusal to provide access to potentially conclusive evidence, at Osborne's own expense and with no valid reason, is an arbitrary action that violates the Due Process Clause. Procedurally, the Alaska courts unfairly applied state law by erroneously concluding the modern testing Osborne sought was available at his trial. Substantively, a convicted person retains a fundamental liberty interest in being free from physical restraint, and when the state holds evidence that could conclusively prove innocence, its refusal to allow testing is arbitrary and conscience-shocking. The state's interest in finality does not outweigh the profound interest in ensuring that justice is done.
Analysis:
This decision establishes that there is no uniform, federal constitutional right to post-conviction DNA testing, leaving the matter primarily to state legislatures and courts. The Court demonstrated a strong reluctance to expand substantive due process, particularly in areas of evolving technology where states are actively legislating. This ruling forces inmates to rely on the specific, and varied, post-conviction procedures available in each state, rather than a single federal standard. The decision thereby preserves states' roles as 'laboratories of democracy' in adapting criminal justice systems to new technology but creates a potential patchwork of access rights for prisoners across the country.
