Dimick v. Schiedt
293 U.S. 474 (1935)
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Rule of Law:
A federal court cannot condition the denial of a plaintiff's motion for a new trial on the defendant's consent to an increase in the damages awarded by the jury (additur), as this practice violates the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.
Facts:
- Dimick sustained a personal injury in an automobile accident.
- The accident was allegedly caused by the negligent operation of an automobile by Schiedt.
- The incident occurred on a public highway in Massachusetts.
Procedural Posture:
- Dimick sued Schiedt in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts for damages from a personal injury.
- A jury returned a verdict in favor of Dimick for $500.
- Dimick moved for a new trial on the grounds that the damages were inadequate.
- The trial court ordered a new trial unless Schiedt consented to an increase of damages to $1,500.
- Schiedt consented to the increase, and the trial court subsequently denied Dimick's motion for a new trial.
- Dimick (appellant) appealed the judgment to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.
- The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the conditional order violated the Seventh Amendment.
- Schiedt (petitioner) was granted a writ of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a federal court's conditioning of the denial of a new trial on the defendant's consent to an increase in the amount of a jury's damage award (additur) violate the plaintiff's Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Sutherland
Yes, conditioning the denial of a new trial on the defendant's consent to an increased damage award violates the plaintiff's Seventh Amendment right to a trial by jury. The Seventh Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial as it existed under English common law in 1791. A careful review of historical English practice shows that courts had no power to increase the amount of damages awarded by a jury in personal tort actions. While the practice of remittitur (denying a defendant's motion for a new trial if the plaintiff agrees to a reduction of excessive damages) has been long accepted in federal courts, it is distinct from additur. In remittitur, the amount the court sets is a subset of what the jury already awarded, thus merely 'lopping off an excrescence.' In contrast, additur is a 'bald addition of something which in no sense can be said to be included in the verdict,' compelling the plaintiff to accept a damage assessment made partly by a court, which has no such power, and not by a jury. Because the Seventh Amendment adopted the common law rules of 1791, changing this rule is not a matter of common law evolution but an unconstitutional alteration.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Stone
No, the practice of additur does not violate the Seventh Amendment. The Amendment is concerned with preserving the substance and essentials of a jury trial, not with freezing the specific 'minutiae' of English trial practice from 1791. The court has the discretionary power to grant or deny a new trial, which includes determining the legal limits of a proper verdict. Additur is the logical counterpart to the accepted practice of remittitur; in both scenarios, the final recovery is determined not by the jury's verdict but by the consent of the party resisting the new trial motion. The plaintiff suffers no infringement of a right because the court could have denied the motion for a new trial outright, and the defendant has consented to the increased amount. Rejecting additur while accepting remittitur is an 'indefensible anachronism' that favors procedural formality over substantial justice and efficiency.
Analysis:
This decision establishes a bright-line rule in federal courts prohibiting the practice of additur while affirming the constitutionality of remittitur. The majority's formalist, historical approach interprets the Seventh Amendment as locking in the specific procedural rules of English common law as they existed in 1791. This creates a significant procedural distinction: while excessive jury verdicts can be corrected without a new trial (via remittitur), inadequate verdicts can only be remedied by granting a full new trial. The ruling has a lasting impact on civil procedure in federal courts, prioritizing a strict historical interpretation of the right to a jury over judicial efficiency.
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