Dimeo v. Max
433 F.Supp. 2d 523, 34 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1921, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34456 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
Interactive computer service providers are immune under 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) from liability for content created by third-party users, even if they engage in traditional editorial functions like selecting, removing, or altering the content.
Facts:
- On December 31, 2005, Anthony DiMeo, III's publicity firm, Renamity, organized a New Year's Eve party at Le Jardín in Philadelphia.
- The party, for which guests paid $100, was severely mismanaged, with twice the expected attendance, insufficient food and alcohol, resulting in property damage, theft, and a police call.
- Tucker Max operates a website, www.tuckermax.com, which hosts message boards where users can post anonymous comments.
- Several message board threads on Max's website were dedicated to DiMeo's disastrous New Year's Eve party, featuring numerous vulgar, ridiculing, and hostile posts about DiMeo.
- Anthony DiMeo, III, specifically objected to six posts on Max's message boards, claiming they were defamatory and that Max, through his website, 'publishes defamatory statements aimed at Plaintiff.'
- Tucker Max did not dispute that he possessed the ability to select, remove, and alter posts on his message boards.
Procedural Posture:
- Anthony DiMeo, III, sued Tucker Max in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, alleging defamation and violation of a federal criminal harassment statute (47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(c)).
- On April 12, 2006, Tucker Max removed the lawsuit to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
- On April 24, 2006, Anthony DiMeo, III, filed a petition to remand the matter back to the Court of Common Pleas, which the U.S. District Court denied on May 25, 2006.
- About a week after removing the case, Tucker Max filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.
- Anthony DiMeo, III, opposed Max's motion to dismiss and, within his response, included a request for leave to file an amended complaint.
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Issue:
Does 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) shield an interactive computer service provider from defamation liability for content posted by third parties, even when the provider exercises some editorial control over that content?
Opinions:
Majority - DALZELL, District Judge
Yes, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) shields an interactive computer service provider from defamation liability for content posted by third parties, even when the provider exercises some editorial control over that content. The court found that Tucker Max's website, www.tuckermax.com, qualifies as an 'interactive computer service' and DiMeo's defamation claim treats Max as a 'publisher or speaker' of information. Crucially, the challenged posts constitute 'information provided by another information content provider,' as Max did not create them. The court reasoned that Congress enacted § 230(c)(1) to advance free speech on the Internet by immunizing providers from liability for third-party content, thereby preventing a 'chilling effect' that would arise from the immense burden of screening millions of posts. Furthermore, the statute encourages self-regulation by explicitly protecting providers who voluntarily restrict objectionable material, reversing prior jurisprudence that penalized such actions. Max's editorial activities (selecting and editing posts) did not transform him into an 'information content provider' because 'development of information' requires something 'more substantial than merely editing portions of [content] and selecting material for publication.' Regarding Count Two, which sought to hold Max civilly liable under a federal criminal harassment statute (47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(c)), the court dismissed it because the statute does not provide a private right of action, Max disclosed his identity through his website's naming, and an 'interactive computer service' is explicitly excluded from the definition of a 'telecommunications device' under the statute. Finally, the court denied DiMeo's request to amend his complaint to add claims for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress and Civil RICO, finding such amendments futile. The proposed emotional distress claim would be barred by § 230(c)(1), and the civil RICO claim failed to meet the pleading requirements, as the alleged criminal acts were not RICO predicates and Max did not commit them as defined by statute.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the broad immunity granted to online platforms under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. By affirming that editorial control, such as selecting or altering user-generated content, does not remove a platform's immunity, the court preserves the legislative intent to foster open internet discourse and encourage self-regulation without fear of traditional publisher liability. The decision underscores the extensive protection afforded to interactive computer services, making it challenging for plaintiffs to hold website operators accountable for third-party defamatory content and potentially insulating platforms from a wide array of state tort claims.
