Dillon v. Legg
68 Cal. 2d 728 (1968)
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Rule of Law:
A plaintiff may recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress caused by observing the negligent injury or death of a close relative, even if the plaintiff is not within the 'zone of physical danger,' provided the plaintiff's emotional injury was a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant's conduct.
Facts:
- A defendant was driving an automobile on Bluegrass Road.
- Margery M. Dillon's infant daughter, Erin Lee Dillon, was lawfully crossing the road.
- The defendant's vehicle negligently collided with Erin Lee Dillon, causing injuries that resulted in her death.
- Margery M. Dillon was in close proximity to the collision and personally witnessed the accident.
- As a direct result of witnessing the accident, Margery Dillon sustained great emotional disturbance, shock, and injury to her nervous system.
- Another daughter, Cheryl Dillon, also witnessed the collision from close proximity and suffered similar emotional and physical injuries.
Procedural Posture:
- Margery M. Dillon sued the defendant in a California trial court for, among other things, negligent infliction of emotional distress (the second cause of action).
- The defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings as to the mother's claim, arguing that she had no cause of action because she was not in the 'zone of danger' as required by existing precedent.
- The trial court granted the defendant's motion regarding the mother's claim and dismissed her cause of action.
- The trial court denied a motion for summary judgment regarding the sister's claim, finding a triable issue of fact as to whether she was within the zone of danger.
- Margery M. Dillon, the mother, appealed the dismissal of her cause of action.
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Issue:
Does a plaintiff who suffers emotional shock and physical injury from witnessing the death of a close family member have a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, even if the plaintiff was not within the zone of physical danger?
Opinions:
Majority - Tobriner, J.
Yes. A cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress may exist for a plaintiff who witnesses injury to a third person, even if the plaintiff was outside the zone of physical danger. The prior 'zone of danger' rule is an artificial and unjust barrier to recovery. The court's duty to a plaintiff should be determined not by a rigid geographical test, but by the general tort principle of foreseeability. The primary arguments against allowing such recovery—fear of fraudulent claims and the difficulty of defining the limits of liability—are unpersuasive. The court trusts juries to weed out fraudulent claims, and it can establish guidelines to limit liability to foreseeable plaintiffs. A defendant who negligently endangers a child should reasonably foresee the likelihood of severe emotional trauma to a mother witnessing the event nearby.
Dissenting - Burke, J.
No. A plaintiff should not have a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress from witnessing an injury to another if they were outside the zone of physical danger. The majority's decision overrules the recent and well-reasoned precedent of Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co. The new foreseeability guidelines are arbitrary, will be impossible to apply consistently, and will open the door to 'the fantastic realm of infinite liability.' The zone-of-danger rule provides a logical and necessary limit, restricting recovery to those who were themselves put in peril of physical impact. The liability imposed by the majority's new doctrine is wholly out of proportion to the culpability of the negligent tortfeasor, and such a significant change in the law should be left to the Legislature.
Analysis:
Dillon v. Legg is a landmark decision in tort law that replaced the rigid 'zone of danger' rule for bystander recovery with a more flexible test based on reasonable foreseeability. This shift reflected a broader movement in torts away from bright-line, categorical rules toward more equitable, fact-sensitive standards. The three-factor foreseeability test established in this case became highly influential and was adopted, in various forms, by many other jurisdictions, fundamentally altering the landscape for claims of negligent infliction of emotional distress. The decision expanded potential liability for tortfeasors but also created new challenges for courts in drawing consistent and predictable lines of demarcation.
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