Dickinson v. Edwards
716 P.2d 814, 105 Wash. 2d 457, 1986 Wash. LEXIS 1088 (1986)
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Rule of Law:
A furnisher of alcohol may be liable for injuries caused by a person who was served while obviously intoxicated; obviousness may be inferred from evidence of excessive consumption and firsthand observations of intoxication made shortly after service. An employer may be vicariously liable for an employee's drunk driving if the intoxication, the proximate cause of the accident, occurred at a company-sponsored event held for the employer's benefit, as this falls within the scope of employment.
Facts:
- Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation (Kaiser) hosted a banquet at the Spokane Red Lion Motor Inn to honor its long-term employees.
- Kaiser paid for all facilities, food, and alcoholic beverages and deducted the costs as a business expense on its federal income tax return.
- Banquet orders stated that servers were to 'keep the glasses filled.'
- Kaiser employee Ersel C. Edwards attended the banquet on the evening of June 22, 1979.
- Between approximately 6:50 p.m. and 10:20 p.m., Edwards consumed 15 to 20 alcoholic drinks.
- Edwards left the banquet at 10:20 p.m. to drive to the Kaiser plant for his night shift.
- At approximately 10:25 p.m., Edwards drove his car the wrong way on a freeway off-ramp and struck a motorcycle driven by the plaintiff, causing severe injuries.
- An investigating police officer observed Edwards at the accident scene around 10:30 p.m. and concluded he was 'obviously intoxicated' based on his unsteadiness, bloodshot eyes, and the smell of alcohol.
Procedural Posture:
- The plaintiff sued Ersel C. Edwards, Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation, and the Red Lion Inn in the trial court.
- Kaiser and Red Lion Inn each moved for summary judgment.
- The trial court granted the motions for summary judgment, dismissing the claims against Kaiser and Red Lion.
- The plaintiff appealed the dismissals to the Washington Court of Appeals.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment.
- The plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Court of Washington.
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Issue:
Does a genuine issue of material fact exist regarding the liability of a commercial vendor and a banquet-hosting employer for injuries caused by an intoxicated employee, when evidence shows the employee consumed a large quantity of alcohol and appeared obviously intoxicated shortly after leaving the event where the alcohol was furnished?
Opinions:
Majority - Brachtenbach, J.
Yes, a genuine issue of material fact exists, and the case should proceed to trial. First, a furnisher of alcohol can be liable for serving an 'obviously intoxicated' person. The lower courts erred by ignoring evidence of the large amount of alcohol Edwards consumed (15-20 drinks) and the police officer's firsthand observations of his intoxication just 10 minutes after he left the banquet. While blood alcohol content alone is insufficient, this combined evidence creates a reasonable inference that Edwards appeared obviously intoxicated when he was last served, which is a question for a jury. Second, an employer may be held vicariously liable under a new application of respondeat superior. The proximate cause of the accident was the intoxication, which occurred when Edwards negligently consumed alcohol at the banquet. Because the banquet was held for the employer's benefit and attendance was expected, a jury could find that Edwards was acting within the scope of his employment at the banquet, making the employer liable for the negligence that occurred there.
Dissenting - Callow, J.
No, summary judgment should be affirmed. The decision to impose liability on furnishers of alcohol is a policy matter for the Legislature, not the judiciary. The Legislature repealed Washington's 'dramshop act' in 1955, signaling its intent to place full responsibility on the person who consumes the alcohol. The majority's decision retroactively changes the standard of conduct, which is unfair to defendants who acted in accordance with the law as it existed at the time. This court should defer to the legislative process on such a complex issue with broad societal implications.
Dissenting - Durham, J.
No, summary judgment should be affirmed. The majority wrongly erases the distinction between a commercial vendor and a social host, as Kaiser was a gratuitous furnisher under the precedent of Halvorson. The majority also radically alters the doctrine of respondeat superior; Edwards was not acting within the scope of employment while driving his own car from the party, per the 'going and coming' rule. To find liability by shifting the negligent act to the consumption of alcohol at the party is an artificial construct designed to circumvent established law. Furthermore, allowing evidence of the quantity consumed and post-driving observations to establish 'obvious intoxication' creates an unworkable and unfair standard for commercial servers like Red Lion.
Concurring - Utter, J.
Yes, a genuine issue of material fact exists. The basis for Kaiser's liability lies not in respondeat superior but in the 'special relationship' between an employer and employee, which creates a duty for the employer to control the employee's conduct at a company-sponsored event. The risk of drunk driving was foreseeable, and Kaiser had the means to control it. For Red Lion, allowing evidence like the officer's testimony and the amount consumed is necessary to prevent the 'obvious intoxication' standard from becoming a sham, where liability could be avoided simply by a server claiming not to have noticed any signs of intoxication. This evidence creates a constructive knowledge standard that allows a jury to weigh all relevant facts.
Analysis:
This decision significantly expanded tort liability for drunk driving accidents in Washington. It broadened the scope of evidence admissible to prove a defendant furnished alcohol to an 'obviously intoxicated' person, making summary judgment for defendants much more difficult to obtain. The ruling allows juries to infer 'obviousness' from circumstantial evidence like the quantity of alcohol served and observations made shortly after service. More critically, it established a novel theory of vicarious liability for employers, holding that the 'scope of employment' can cover an employee's conduct at a company-sponsored party, and that the negligence (intoxication) occurring at the party can serve as the proximate cause for a subsequent car accident, thus bypassing the traditional 'going and coming' rule.
