Dickey v. Long
1991 WL 137621, 575 N.E.2d 339, 1991 Ind. App. LEXIS 1183 (1991)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
Under Indiana law, a medical review panel's expert opinion report is mandatorily admissible as evidence in a subsequent medical malpractice action, and its admission cannot be challenged on the basis that the panel allegedly exceeded its statutory authority by determining a material issue of fact not requiring expert opinion.
Facts:
- In June 1986, Pamela S. Dickey consulted Dr. James A. Long, II, because her eight-year-old son, Eric L. Dickey, had his right eye turn inward.
- Dr. Long treated Eric's eye crossing with patching and glasses for approximately one year.
- Approximately one year after beginning treatment with Dr. Long, Eric was seen by a pediatrician for a camp physical.
- The pediatrician noticed that Eric's optic discs were elevated and referred him to an ophthalmologist.
- The ophthalmologist discovered a condition requiring the installation of a shunt to drain excess cerebrospinal fluid, which relieved pressure from Eric's optic nerve.
- Approximately one year after the shunt operation, doctors discovered a small quiescent tumor deep in Eric's mid-brain.
Procedural Posture:
- On September 15, 1989, a medical review panel, comprised of three optometrists, rendered a decision finding that "the evidence does not support the conclusion that the Defendant, James A. Long, II, O.D., failed to comply with the appropriate standard of care as charged in the Complaint."
- On October 17, 1989, Pamela S. Dickey filed a complaint in Allen Superior Court (trial court) against Dr. James A. Long, II, alleging medical malpractice.
- Prior to trial, Dickey unsuccessfully sought an order in limine to exclude the medical review panel's determination from evidence.
- At trial, Dickey properly objected to the admission of the medical review panel's report when it was offered into evidence, but the trial court admitted it.
- After a trial by jury, the trial court entered an adverse judgment against Dickey on her medical malpractice claim.
- Plaintiff-appellant Pamela S. Dickey appealed the adverse judgment to the Indiana Court of Appeals.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Did the trial court err by admitting the medical review panel's opinion into evidence when the plaintiff argued the panel exceeded its statutory authority by determining a material issue of fact which did not require expert opinion?
Opinions:
Majority - Hoffman, Presiding Judge
No, the trial court did not err in admitting the medical review panel's opinion into evidence. The court held that the Indiana statute, IND.CODE § 16-9.5-9-9, unambiguously and absolutely mandates the admissibility of "any report of the expert opinion reached by the medical review panel." The court rejected Dickey's argument that the report was inadmissible because the panel allegedly exceeded its statutory authority by determining a fact not requiring medical expertise. It clarified that the suggestion to the contrary in Spencer v. Christiansen was obiter dictum and lacked supporting authority. The statute provides safeguards for claimants, stating that the panel's opinion is "not conclusive" and allowing either party to call and examine any panel member as a witness at trial. The court noted that Dickey availed herself of these safeguards by thoroughly examining a panelist, thereby exposing any "frailties in the panel opinion" to the trier of fact.
Concurring - Ratliff, C.J.
Concurred.
Concurring - Staton, J.
Concurred.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the mandatory nature of medical review panel report admissibility under Indiana's Medical Malpractice Act. It prevents plaintiffs from excluding such reports pre-trial by arguing the panel overstepped its bounds. Instead, it shifts the focus to challenging the report's credibility and weight during trial through cross-examination and other evidence, reinforcing the legislative intent that these reports are part of the evidence for the jury to consider, not a gatekeeping mechanism. This ruling streamlines medical malpractice litigation by limiting pre-trial motions to exclude panel reports and emphasizes the robustness of the trial process in assessing expert opinions.
