Dickey v. Florida
1970 U.S. LEXIS 38, 398 U.S. 30, 26 L. Ed. 2d 26 (1970)
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Rule of Law:
An excessive and unjustified delay in bringing a defendant to trial, particularly when the defendant is incarcerated in another jurisdiction, repeatedly demands trial, and suffers actual prejudice to their defense as a result of the delay, constitutes a violation of the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
Facts:
- On June 28, 1960, a motor court in Gadsden County, Florida, was robbed by a lone armed man. The only eyewitness was Mrs. Ralph Clark.
- Shortly thereafter, Robert Dickey was arrested on unrelated federal bank robbery charges.
- On July 1, 1960, Mrs. Clark identified Dickey in jail as the robber, and Florida authorities secured an arrest warrant for him.
- Dickey was convicted on the federal charges and sent to federal prisons, first Leavenworth and then Alcatraz. Florida officials lodged a formal detainer against him but made no effort to bring him to trial.
- Between 1960 and 1967, Dickey was continuously available to Florida authorities for trial.
- During the seven-year delay, two potential defense witnesses died, another became unavailable, and the investigating officer's notes from the crime scene were destroyed.
- Dickey's defense at trial was that he was in Waycross, Georgia, at the time of the robbery.
Procedural Posture:
- In 1962, Dickey filed a petition in Gadsden County Circuit Court (a state trial court) seeking to compel Florida to try him; the court denied the petition.
- Dickey filed similar, unsuccessful petitions in the same court in 1963 and 1966.
- Dickey next petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida for a writ of mandamus, which held that the state had a duty to try him but dismissed the petition on a technicality (naming the wrong respondent).
- In 1967, following another motion by Dickey, the State Attorney secured his return to Florida. Dickey was tried in the Circuit Court in 1968.
- Before trial, Dickey's counsel moved to quash the charges for denial of a speedy trial; the trial court denied the motion.
- A jury convicted Dickey, and he was sentenced to 10 years in prison.
- Dickey (as appellant) appealed the conviction to the Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (an intermediate appellate court), arguing the trial court erred in denying his motion to quash. The State of Florida was the appellee.
- The District Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction without a detailed opinion.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted Dickey's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Florida District Court of Appeal.
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Issue:
Does a state's delay of over seven years in bringing a defendant to trial for armed robbery, during which he was incarcerated in a federal prison, repeatedly demanded trial, and key defense witnesses became unavailable, violate the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Chief Justice Burger
Yes. The delay with its consequent prejudice is intolerable as a matter of fact and impermissible as a matter of law, violating the petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The Court reasoned that the right to a speedy trial is fundamental, designed to prevent stale claims and ensure a defendant can meet charges when the case is fresh. Here, Dickey was available to the State of Florida at all times during the seven-year period, and he diligently and repeatedly demanded a trial. The State offered no tenable reason for the delay, which was exclusively for its own convenience. The Court found abundant evidence of actual prejudice—the death of two witnesses, the unavailability of another, and the loss of police records—which impaired Dickey's ability to mount a defense. Therefore, the conviction must be reversed and the charges dismissed.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Harlan
Yes. Petitioner's federal constitutional rights were violated by Florida's actions. However, such claims arising from state proceedings should be judged by the principles of procedural fairness required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not by incorporating the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial provision. While disagreeing with the Court's 'incorporation' methodology, I fully agree with the result that the delay was unconstitutional.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Brennan
Yes. Petitioner established his claim of an unconstitutional delay because he was not tried until 1968 for a 1960 crime, he demanded a speedy trial as early as 1962, he was substantially prejudiced by the delay, and the state was deliberately slow in prosecuting him. This opinion concurs to outline the major unresolved questions regarding the speedy-trial guarantee. These questions include when the right attaches in the criminal process and what criteria—such as the reason for delay, waiver, and prejudice—should be used to judge the constitutionality of a delay. The opinion argues for a more hospitable interpretation of the right, suggesting that prejudice may be presumed after a long delay and that the government, not the defendant, bears the responsibility for ensuring a prompt trial.
Analysis:
This case solidified the principle from Smith v. Hooey that a state has an affirmative constitutional duty to make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring an incarcerated defendant to trial, even if the defendant is held in another jurisdiction. The Court's emphasis on the combination of delay, demand, and actual prejudice laid the groundwork for the multi-factor balancing test later established in Barker v. Wingo (1972). Justice Brennan's influential concurrence explicitly foreshadows the Barker factors by exploring the complex criteria for analyzing speedy trial claims, making this decision a critical step in defining the modern scope of the Sixth Amendment right. The case serves as a clear warning to prosecutors that they cannot indefinitely delay prosecution for their own convenience at the expense of an accused's constitutional rights and ability to present a defense.
