Dickerson v. Martin
450 S.W.2d 520, 1970 Ky. LEXIS 452 (1970)
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Rule of Law:
A plaintiff who is contributorily negligent as a matter of law may still recover damages under the last clear chance doctrine if the defendant had a sufficient, non-speculative opportunity to avoid the accident after the plaintiff was in a position of peril.
Facts:
- Norman Keith Martin, an 18-year-old, left his home to walk across South Seminary Street to collect a neighbor's mail.
- The street was 24 feet wide and had a speed limit of 35 mph.
- After collecting the mail, Martin began to cross back from the west side of the street, not within a marked crosswalk.
- Before stepping off the curb, Martin saw the headlights of a northbound car driven by William A. Dickerson, which he estimated was about 550 feet away.
- Martin began walking across the street at a 'normal pace,' believing he had ample time to cross.
- Martin admitted he never looked south again to check on the progress of Dickerson's vehicle after his initial observation.
- Dickerson's car struck Martin with its right front fender when Martin was just a 'step or two' from reaching the east curb.
- The area where Martin crossed was well-lit by an overhanging street lamp.
Procedural Posture:
- Norman Keith Martin sued William A. Dickerson and William T. Dickerson for damages in a state trial court.
- At trial, the Dickersons moved for a directed verdict, arguing Martin was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
- The trial court overruled the Dickersons' motion.
- The jury returned a verdict in favor of Martin, awarding him $12,193.70 in damages.
- The Dickersons (appellants) appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, the state's highest court at the time.
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Issue:
Does the last clear chance doctrine permit recovery for a pedestrian who was contributorily negligent as a matter of law for crossing a street outside a crosswalk and failing to maintain a lookout for a vehicle he knew was approaching?
Opinions:
Majority - Neikirk, Judge
Yes, the doctrine of last clear chance can apply even when a pedestrian is contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The court first held that Martin was contributorily negligent as a matter of law for violating his statutory duty to yield the right of way and for failing to keep a reasonable lookout for his own safety after stepping into the street. However, the court distinguished this case from others where the last clear chance doctrine was held inapplicable. Unlike cases where the pedestrian's peril was only momentary, here there was evidence Martin was in the street and visible to Dickerson for up to twelve seconds. This prolonged period in a well-lit area provided Dickerson a 'clear chance,' not merely a 'speculative possibility,' to avoid the collision by exercising ordinary care. Therefore, it was proper for the jury to consider whether Dickerson had the last clear chance to avoid the accident.
Analysis:
This case refines the application of the last clear chance doctrine, clarifying the distinction between 'concurrent negligence' and a true 'last chance.' The decision establishes that even when a plaintiff's negligence is so clear that it can be decided as a matter of law, recovery is not automatically barred. The key factor becomes the duration and obviousness of the plaintiff's peril, which, if sufficient, can create a jury question as to whether the defendant had a final, clear opportunity to prevent the harm. This precedent prevents the contributory negligence defense from being an absolute bar in situations where a defendant's subsequent negligence is the more direct cause of the injury.
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