Dickason v. Dickason
1980 Okla. LEXIS 213, 1980 OK 24, 607 P.2d 674 (1980)
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Rule of Law:
When a divorce decree incorporates a spousal agreement that is silent on a statutory provision, the statute applies by default. The decree cannot be modified based on extrinsic evidence of the parties' original intent after the statutory time limits for modification or vacation of a judgment have expired.
Facts:
- A husband and wife entered into a pre-divorce agreement to settle their rights regarding property, alimony, and child custody.
- The agreement stipulated that the wife would receive support alimony of $34,000, to be paid in monthly installments of $575 for sixty months.
- The agreement did not contain any provision stating whether the alimony obligation would terminate upon the wife's death or remarriage.
- A court issued a divorce decree on June 25, 1975, which incorporated the terms of the spousal agreement.
- The decree, like the agreement, was silent regarding the effect of the wife's potential remarriage on the alimony obligation.
- The wife remarried on July 7, 1977.
- The husband ceased making alimony payments in the month following the wife's remarriage.
Procedural Posture:
- More than two years after the divorce decree and 90 days after her remarriage, the wife (obligee) filed an 'application for payment of alimony' in the trial court.
- In this proceeding, she sought to modify the original decree, claiming the parties intended alimony to continue post-remarriage and alleging fraud or misrepresentation.
- The husband (obligor) defended, arguing state statute § 1289(B) automatically terminated his alimony obligation.
- The trial court refused to consider the wife's offer of proof extrinsic to the judgment roll.
- The trial court denied the wife's application and issued an order terminating the husband's alimony liability as a matter of law.
- The wife (obligee), as appellant, appealed the trial court's order.
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Issue:
May a final divorce decree, which is silent on whether support alimony terminates upon remarriage, be modified to reflect the parties' alleged original intent to continue payments, when the request for modification is made after the statutory time limits have expired?
Opinions:
Majority - Opala, Justice
No. A final divorce decree that is silent on a statutory termination provision cannot be modified based on extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent after the time limits for such modification have passed. Once a pre-suit agreement is incorporated into a divorce decree, it merges with the decree and its terms become governed and enforceable as a judgment, not a contract. To override a statutory provision, such as the termination of alimony upon remarriage under § 1289(B), the parties' intent to do so must be expressly stated in the agreement and decree. Because the decree here was silent and unambiguous, and the wife's application to modify it was filed more than two years after the decree was rendered and more than 90 days after her remarriage, her action is time-barred under the statutes governing modification of judgments and continuation of alimony.
Analysis:
This case reinforces the principle of finality of judgments and the merger doctrine in family law. It establishes that statutory default rules, such as the termination of alimony upon remarriage, will be read into silent consent decrees. The decision serves as a clear warning to practitioners and parties to explicitly contract around statutory provisions if they wish to avoid their application. By strictly enforcing the statutory time limits for modifying judgments, the court prevents parties from using extrinsic evidence to relitigate settled matters years after a decree has become final.
