Yes, federal rules must be used, and the worker gets a jury. A federal law designed to protect workers across the country can't be weakened by different state laws. It's not fair to let a company benefit from its own deliberate lies. The right to have a jury decide what the facts are is a huge and basic part of the protection this federal law gives to workers, so a state court can't take that right away and have a judge decide instead.

Yes, federal rules should decide if the release form was fair, but No, the state court should be able to use its own process for who decides. This opinion agrees that the Ohio court used the wrong standard (state instead of federal) to judge the release. However, it disagrees that the state court must use a jury. The dissent argues that as long as a state court handles all similar cases the same way (like having a judge decide fraud issues), it shouldn't have to change its process just for these federal railroad cases.

Federal law, not state law, should be used to decide if the paper the worker signed is valid. Under federal law, if the railroad lied to trick the worker into signing away his rights, then the paper is void and can't be used. The Ohio Supreme Court was wrong to use Ohio law and take away the jury's decision that sided with the worker. The worker's right to a jury trial is too important under the federal law to let a state deny it.

I agree that federal law applies, so the Ohio decision was wrong. But I disagree with the Court telling Ohio how to handle the case. Ohio's rules for using a judge or jury shouldn't be ignored unless they treat the worker's federal rights unfairly. The case should just be sent back for Ohio to decide the issue of trickery under the federal rules, without forcing them to use a jury if they normally wouldn't in this situation.

The freedom of individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish a free nation from a police state

T] he First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers

A statute "that make [s] unlawful a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct may be held facially invalid

The Supreme Court ruled the pertinent ordinance unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment, noting the following: "[T] he First Amendment protects a significant amount of verbal criticism and challenge directed at police officers. `Speech is often provocative and challenging...[But it] is nevertheless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown …

The ordinance made it "unlawful for any person to... in any manner oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt any policeman in the execution of his duty."

Plaintiff asserts that a significant amount of verbal criticism of police officers is protected under the First Amendment

In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell suggested that "even the `fighting words' exception recognized in Chaplinsky... might require a narrower application in cases involving words addressed to a police officer, because `a properly trained officer may reasonably be expected to exercise a higher degree of restraint'than the average citizen, and thus be less likely to …

—unconstitutional a city ordinance making it unlawful to interrupt a police officer in the performance of his or her duties.

"Where there is no ambiguity in the state statute, the federal court should not abstain but should proceed to decide the federal constitutional claim."

The Court there explained that the Colten ordinance "prohibit [ed] only disorderly conduct or fighting words" and survived the First Amendment challenge only because it "infringe [d] no protected speech or conduct."

Yes, federal law governs the validity of a release in a FELA case, and the right to a jury trial on the issue of fraud is a fundamental part of the federal remedy that state courts must honor. First, the validity of releases under FELA is a federal question to be determined by uniform federal law, as state laws cannot be used to defeat the rights granted by Congress. Second, the correct federal rule is that a release is void if the employee was induced to sign it by deliberately false statements from the employer's representatives as to its contents; a rule that holds an employee to a release despite such fraud is incongruous with FELA's protective policy. Third, the right to a jury trial is a 'basic and fundamental feature' and 'part and parcel of the remedy' under FELA. A state cannot classify this right as a mere 'local rule of procedure' to single out the issue of fraud for determination by a judge, thereby depriving a railroad worker of a jury's evaluation of the evidence.

Yes, federal law should determine the substantive standard for the validity of the release, but No, states are not required to alter their procedural rules regarding the allocation of duties between judge and jury. The opinion concurs that the case must be reversed because the Ohio court applied a state, rather than federal, standard for evaluating the release's validity. However, it dissents from the majority's holding on the jury trial issue. Citing Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co. v. Bombolis, the dissent argues that a state which hears FELA cases is not obligated to adopt federal court procedures, including the use of a jury for all factual issues. So long as Ohio applies its rule—that a judge decides equitable issues like fraud in the inducement—uniformly to all negligence cases, it does not discriminate against FELA claims, and federal law does not compel it to change its established 'mechanics of litigation.'

The validity of releases under the Federal Employers' Liability Act raises a federal question to be determined by federal rather than state law. Under federal law, a release is void when the employee is induced to sign it by the deliberately false and material statements of the railroad's authorized representatives made to deceive the employee as to the contents of the release. The Supreme Court of Ohio erred in holding that Ohio law governed and in taking away petitioner's verdict when the issues of fraud had been submitted to the jury on conflicting evidence and determined in petitioner's favor. The right to trial by jury is too substantial a part of the rights accorded by the Federal Employers' Liability Act to permit it to be classified as a mere 'local rule of procedure' for denial in the manner that Ohio has here used.

I agree that the judgment below must be reversed, as the validity of a release under the Federal Employers' Liability Act is a federal question. However, I dissent from the Court's opinion. Ohio's local rules governing the distribution of functions between judge and jury in determining fraud should not be overridden unless they discriminate against or diminish the federal right. The case should be remanded solely for the Ohio courts to determine the question of fraud under the applicable federal standard, without dictating the mode of trial. So long as all negligence suits in a State are treated the same way procedurally, the State does not discriminate against federal claims.

Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown Railroad Co.

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