Dibble v. Jensen
129 So. 2d 162 (1961)
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Rule of Law:
Under the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, a civil action is commenced and the statute of limitations is tolled upon the filing of the complaint. A defendant's absence from the state does not toll the statute if the plaintiff can commence the action by filing the complaint, regardless of their ability to immediately serve process.
Facts:
- On September 17, 1954, a motor vehicle owned and operated by Ruth Mark Jensen Cresse collided with a vehicle driven by Roy Dibble in Perry, Florida.
- At the time of the collision, Cresse was a resident of Dade County, Florida.
- Subsequent to the accident, Cresse divorced her husband.
- Around May 1957, Cresse moved from Florida and became a resident of New Jersey.
- Dibble was unable to locate Cresse to serve her with legal papers until after the four-year statute of limitations period had passed.
Procedural Posture:
- Roy Dibble filed a complaint against Ruth Mark Jensen Cresse in a Florida trial court on January 4, 1960, for damages arising from the 1954 car accident.
- Cresse filed an answer which included the affirmative defense that the action was barred by the four-year statute of limitations.
- Cresse moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the statute of limitations had expired.
- The trial court granted Cresse's motion for judgment on the pleadings, dismissing Dibble's case as time-barred.
- Dibble, as the appellant, appealed the trial court's judgment to the District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
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Issue:
Does a defendant's absence from the state toll the statute of limitations when the plaintiff could have commenced the action and stopped the statute from running by filing a complaint within the statutory period?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. A defendant's absence from the state does not toll the statute of limitations when the plaintiff had the ability to commence the suit by filing a complaint. The court reasoned that under Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.2, a civil suit is deemed commenced "when the complaint is filed." Citing the precedent set in Klosenski v. Flaherty, the court affirmed that the act of filing the complaint is what tolls the statute of limitations. Therefore, Dibble's inability to perfect service of process on Cresse was irrelevant to stopping the statutory clock. He could have and should have filed his complaint at any time within the four-year statutory period to preserve his claim. His failure to do so within the prescribed time bars his cause of action.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the principle in Florida law that the procedural act of filing a complaint is the sole, critical event for tolling the statute of limitations. It effectively decouples the commencement of a suit for limitation purposes from the subsequent requirement of serving process on the defendant. The ruling clarifies that statutory provisions for tolling due to a defendant's absence are inapplicable when a procedural mechanism (filing the complaint) exists to stop the clock. This places the burden squarely on the plaintiff to timely initiate legal action by filing with the court, irrespective of any difficulties in locating the defendant for service.
