Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk District
466 Mass. 655 (2013)
Rule of Law:
Under Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, the imposition of a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole on an individual who was under the age of eighteen at the time of their crime is an unconstitutionally cruel or unusual punishment, regardless of whether the sentence is mandatory or discretionary.
Facts:
- On the evening of May 9, 1981, Gregory Diatchenko was seventeen years old.
- While near Kenmore Square in Boston, Diatchenko stabbed Thomas Wharf nine times as Wharf sat in his automobile.
- The stabbing occurred during the course of an armed robbery.
- Thomas Wharf was pronounced dead later that evening as a result of the stabbing.
Procedural Posture:
- A Superior Court jury convicted Gregory Diatchenko of murder in the first degree.
- Pursuant to statute, the trial court sentenced Diatchenko to a mandatory term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.
- Diatchenko filed a direct appeal with the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the state's highest court.
- In 1982, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, rejecting his claim that the sentence was unconstitutional.
- Thirty years later, following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama, Diatchenko filed a petition in the county court challenging his sentence.
- A single justice of the county court reserved and reported the entire matter to the full Supreme Judicial Court for a decision.
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Issue:
Does the imposition of a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole on an individual who was under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense violate the prohibition against 'cruel or unusual punishments' under Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights?
Opinions:
Majority - Spina, J.
Yes, the imposition of a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole on an individual who was under eighteen at the time of the offense violates Article 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. First, the court determines that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama, which banned mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles under the Eighth Amendment, announced a new substantive rule that applies retroactively to cases on collateral review. Consequently, the Massachusetts statute mandating such a sentence is unconstitutional. Going further, the court holds that even discretionary life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate Article 26. Citing scientific research on adolescent brain development, the court reasons that juveniles possess diminished culpability and a greater capacity for reform, making them 'constitutionally different from adults for purposes of sentencing.' Because a juvenile's character is not fully formed, a sentencing judge can never find with confidence that a juvenile offender is 'irretrievably depraved' and deserving of the state's harshest possible punishment. The punishment is unconstitutionally disproportionate to the offender, and the proper remedy is to invalidate the parole ineligibility portion of the statute for all juvenile offenders, making them eligible for parole consideration.
Concurring - Lenk, J.
Yes. This opinion concurs with the majority's holding but writes separately to emphasize that the opportunity for release must be 'meaningful.' A meaningful opportunity requires that parole suitability decisions be informed by an understanding of the distinctive attributes of youth, such as immaturity and impetuosity, which diminish the penological justifications for harsh sentences. If the parole board fails to consider these factors, the opportunity for release may be compromised, undermining the core reasoning of the court's decision.
Analysis:
This decision significantly expands juvenile justice protections in Massachusetts beyond the federal floor set by Miller v. Alabama. While Miller only banned mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles and required individualized sentencing hearings, this court categorically prohibits the sentence altogether for juveniles under the state constitution. This establishes Massachusetts as a leader in juvenile sentencing reform and sets a strong precedent for other state supreme courts to interpret their own constitutions as providing greater protection than the Eighth Amendment. The ruling effectively eliminates the possibility that any individual who committed a crime as a juvenile will be sentenced to die in a Massachusetts prison.
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