Di Pasquale v. Karnuth
158 F.2d 878, 1947 U.S. App. LEXIS 2413 (1947)
Rule of Law:
Under immigration statutes, an alien does not make a legal 'entry' into the United States when their physical passage into foreign territory and return is unintentional, unknowing, and occurs while asleep on a direct transit between two domestic points.
Facts:
- DiPasquale lawfully entered the United States from Italy in 1907 at age fourteen and resided continuously in Buffalo, New York.
- In 1915, DiPasquale was convicted of robbery.
- On September 15, 1918, DiPasquale purchased a ticket and boarded a train to travel from Buffalo, New York, to Detroit, Michigan.
- The railroad route utilized by the train passed through Canadian territory.
- DiPasquale was asleep during the entire time the train was physically outside the United States.
- DiPasquale did not know the train route entered Canada and had no intention of leaving the United States.
- In 1919, after arriving in Detroit, DiPasquale was convicted of a second robbery and sentenced to thirty-eight years in prison.
Procedural Posture:
- Immigration authorities arrested DiPasquale and ordered him deported based on his 1919 conviction following an alleged 1918 entry.
- DiPasquale filed a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court to challenge the deportation order.
- The district court dismissed the writ of habeas corpus.
- DiPasquale appealed the dismissal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
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Issue:
Does a lawful permanent resident alien make an 'entry' into the United States, thereby subjecting themselves to deportation for subsequent crimes, if they unknowingly travel through foreign territory while asleep on a train moving between two United States cities?
Opinions:
Majority - Learned Hand
No, the Court held that an alien does not make an 'entry' under the statute when their departure and return involves an unwitting passage through foreign territory while travelling between two domestic locations. Judge Hand reasoned that the term 'entry' implies a degree of intent or at least knowledge. While the court acknowledged that a specific intent to leave the U.S. might not be required if the alien knew the route would cross a border (citing Zurbrick v. Borg), DiPasquale possessed neither intent nor knowledge. He was asleep and simply acquiesced to whatever route the railroad chose. The Court explicitly rejected the First Circuit's reasoning in Ward v. DeBarros, which imputed the carrier's intent to the passenger. Hand argued that imposing a duty on aliens to research the specific routes of domestic public transportation to avoid accidental border crossings would create a 'trap' and subject established residents to the 'sport of chance.' Because DiPasquale did not legally 'enter' in 1918, his 1919 conviction did not occur within five years of entry, making him not subject to deportation.
Analysis:
This decision is a significant example of statutory interpretation where the court looks to the spirit rather than the strict letter of the law to avoid absurd or unjust results. Judge Learned Hand introduces a mental state requirement (knowledge or intent) to the physical act of crossing a border for immigration purposes. The ruling protects long-term residents from losing their status due to innocent, accidental, or involuntary departures from the country. It distinguishes between a voluntary choice to travel abroad and the passive, unknowing transit through foreign soil by a common carrier. This case stands as a safeguard against the arbitrary application of deportation laws based on technicalities that the affected individual could not reasonably foresee.
