DeWees v. RCN CORP.
883 A.2d 387, 380 N.J. Super. 511 (2005)
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Rule of Law:
In a claim of employment discrimination under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), a plaintiff can defeat a motion for summary judgment by demonstrating sufficient weaknesses, inconsistencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for termination, allowing a rational factfinder to infer that those reasons are pretextual and that discrimination was a motivating factor.
Facts:
- Marie DeWees began working for C-Tec, RCN's predecessor, in May 1990.
- DeWees received several promotions, eventually becoming senior vice president of customer service in February 1997 at age fifty, holding the highest-ranking woman position in the company.
- In 1996, DeWees complained that her salary was lower than it should have been and was allegedly told by CEO David McCourt that President Michael Mahoney wanted to reduce her substantial 1996 bonus, unlike those of two male executives.
- DeWees experienced a male-centric atmosphere at RCN, including McCourt introducing her with a vulgar comment, Mahoney having an "elitist" and "dismissive" attitude towards women, and Mahoney "snickering" and making a sexist comment about her and another woman discussing "technical issues."
- In June or July 1997, McCourt moved DeWees from marketing/sales to customer service due to poor subscriber gains, a "job in the black hole" with accountability but no authority, which she initially declined but accepted.
- DeWees reported to Scott Jarus, who she claims was sarcastic, belittling, undermined her authority by assigning projects directly to her subordinates without her knowledge, and failed to provide necessary tools or include her in meetings.
- Mahoney terminated DeWees on January 13, 1998, citing "deteriorating work performance" and a "personality conflict" with Jarus, despite DeWees's prior "superior or exceptional" performance reviews and Mahoney's admission that DeWees lacked authority to address customer service infrastructure needs.
- Mahoney claimed he tried to find DeWees another position, but three executives he named denied being approached, and Mahoney was aware that DeWees's stock options were about to vest but chose not to keep her on payroll until then, a timing characterized as "punitive" by a former supervisor.
Procedural Posture:
- Marie DeWees filed a lawsuit in the Law Division (trial court) against RCN Corporation, David McCourt, Michael Mahoney, and Kenneth Knudsen, alleging gender and age discrimination under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD).
- Plaintiff Marie DeWees did not pursue her claims against defendant Kenneth Knudsen.
- Defendants moved for summary judgment in the Law Division, which the court granted, concluding that DeWees had not produced sufficient evidence to show that defendants' proffered business reasons for her termination (poor performance and a personality conflict with her superior) were pretextual.
- Plaintiff Marie DeWees appealed the dismissal of her cause of action to the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.
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Issue:
Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment against Marie DeWees by misapplying the summary judgment standard, thereby failing to recognize that DeWees presented sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find RCN's stated reasons for her termination (poor performance and personality conflict) to be pretextual for gender and age discrimination?
Opinions:
Majority - Fuentes, J.A.D.
Yes, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because it misapplied the summary judgment standard by weighing the evidence and failing to properly consider whether Marie DeWees presented sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find RCN's reasons for her termination were a pretext for discrimination. Justice Fuentes, writing for the Appellate Division, explained that when reviewing a summary judgment motion, courts must view all competent evidential materials in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, without assessing credibility or weighing the evidence. The trial court correctly identified the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework for discrimination cases but failed to apply the Fuentes standard for summary judgment, which allows a plaintiff to defeat such a motion by either discrediting the employer's proffered reasons (demonstrating weaknesses, inconsistencies, or contradictions) or by adducing direct or circumstantial evidence that discrimination was more likely than not the motivating cause. The lower court improperly focused on whether each piece of DeWees's evidence, alone, could infer discrimination, instead of considering if the collective evidence allowed a jury to reject the employer's stated reasons. For example, the court failed to recognize that the preferential treatment of younger male employees (reassigning them instead of terminating them for poor performance), combined with inconsistencies in Mahoney's testimony (e.g., claiming he sought other positions for DeWees which other executives denied), could lead a jury to discredit the performance-related justification. Furthermore, DeWees's characterization of Jarus's behavior as extreme and undermining, rather than a mere personality conflict, could also lead a jury to find that reason unworthy of belief. The court emphasized that even "somewhat sexist" comments, while not directly related to termination, could reveal discriminatory animus when considered with other circumstantial evidence like the differential handling of bonuses and stock options for male executives. Therefore, a rational jury could find that DeWees discredited RCN's legitimate non-discriminatory reasons and infer intentional discrimination.
Analysis:
This case significantly reinforces the high bar for employers seeking summary judgment in discrimination cases under the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD). It clarifies that judges cannot weigh evidence or assess credibility at the summary judgment stage, and must view all facts and inferences in favor of the plaintiff. The decision highlights that a plaintiff can survive summary judgment not only by providing direct evidence of discrimination but also by demonstrating that an employer's stated non-discriminatory reasons are simply unbelievable or inconsistent, which can allow a jury to infer discriminatory intent. This makes it more challenging for employers to dispose of discrimination claims pre-trial and emphasizes the importance of a holistic view of circumstantial evidence, including seemingly "isolated" comments, in proving discriminatory animus.
