Devenpeck v. Alford
543 U.S. 146 (2004)
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Rule of Law:
A warrantless arrest is lawful under the Fourth Amendment as long as the facts and circumstances known to the arresting officer establish probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, regardless of whether the stated reason for the arrest is the offense for which probable cause actually exists.
Facts:
- Jerome Alford pulled his car over behind a disabled vehicle on a highway shoulder and activated flashing 'wig-wag' headlights.
- The stranded motorists told Officer Joi Haner that Alford's statements and flashing lights made them believe he was a police officer.
- Haner initiated a traffic stop of Alford on the suspicion that he was impersonating an officer.
- During the stop, Haner observed a police scanner and handcuffs inside Alford's car and found his answers to questions to be evasive.
- Sergeant Gerald Devenpeck arrived and, during his questioning of Alford, discovered a tape recorder on the passenger seat recording their conversation.
- Devenpeck informed Alford he was under arrest for violating the Washington Privacy Act by recording their conversation.
- At booking, Alford was charged with violating the Privacy Act and was also issued a ticket for his flashing headlights.
Procedural Posture:
- Jerome Alford filed suit against Officers Devenpeck and Haner in U.S. District Court, alleging unlawful arrest in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
- The District Court denied the officers' motion for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity.
- Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant officers, Devenpeck and Haner.
- Alford, as appellant, appealed the verdict to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment, holding that the arrest was unlawful because probable cause for the unstated offenses (impersonating an officer, obstruction) was not 'closely related' to the stated offense of violating the Privacy Act.
- The officers, Devenpeck and Haner, as petitioners, petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does a warrantless arrest violate the Fourth Amendment when the criminal offense for which probable cause exists is not closely related to the offense stated by the arresting officer at the time of the arrest?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Scalia
No. A warrantless arrest does not violate the Fourth Amendment so long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the action. An officer's subjective reason for making an arrest need not be the criminal offense for which the known facts provide probable cause. The Court's precedent, particularly in Whren v. United States, establishes that an officer's state of mind is irrelevant to the existence of probable cause. The Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard is an objective one. A rule requiring the stated offense to be 'closely related' to the offense for which probable cause exists is inconsistent with this objective standard, as it would make the constitutionality of an arrest dependent on the officer's subjective motivation or ability to correctly articulate the legal basis for the arrest. Such a rule would lead to arbitrary results where an arrest's validity would 'vary from place to place and from time to time,' and would perversely incentivize officers to either provide no reason for an arrest or to list every conceivable charge.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the purely objective standard for determining the validity of an arrest under the Fourth Amendment. By rejecting the 'closely related offense' rule, the Court eliminated a requirement that would have re-introduced a subjective element into the probable cause analysis. The ruling provides law enforcement with greater certainty that an arrest based on sufficient factual evidence for any crime will be upheld, even if the officer initially misidentifies the offense. It clarifies for lower courts that the focus of the inquiry must be on the facts known to the officer, not the officer's stated justification or subjective intent.

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