DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services
489 U.S. 189 (1989)
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Rule of Law:
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not impose a general affirmative obligation on a state to protect individuals from harm inflicted by private actors. An affirmative duty to protect only arises when the state takes a person into its custody and holds them against their will, thereby creating a 'special relationship' and limiting their freedom to act on their own behalf.
Facts:
- In 1980, after a divorce, Randy DeShaney was awarded custody of his infant son, Joshua DeShaney, and they moved to Winnebago County, Wisconsin.
- In January 1982, Randy DeShaney's second wife reported to police that he was abusing Joshua, prompting an interview by the Winnebago County Department of Social Services (DSS), which took no further action.
- In January 1983, Joshua was hospitalized with suspicious injuries. DSS obtained a court order for temporary custody, but a county 'Child Protection Team' concluded there was insufficient evidence of abuse and returned Joshua to his father.
- Over the next fourteen months, DSS received numerous reports from emergency room personnel about Joshua's suspicious injuries.
- A DSS caseworker made monthly visits, observed and recorded suspicious head injuries, but took no action to remove Joshua from his father's custody.
- On two occasions, the caseworker was told Joshua was too ill to be seen, but DSS still took no action.
- In March 1984, Randy DeShaney beat 4-year-old Joshua so severely that he fell into a life-threatening coma, resulting in permanent, profound brain damage.
Procedural Posture:
- Joshua DeShaney and his mother filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Winnebago County, the Department of Social Services (DSS), and several DSS employees in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
- The complaint alleged that the defendants' failure to protect Joshua from his father's violence deprived him of his liberty without due process of law in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
- The District Court (the court of first instance) granted summary judgment for the defendants.
- The petitioners (Joshua and his mother) appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment, holding that the Due Process Clause does not require a state to protect its citizens from private violence.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to resolve a conflict among the lower courts on this issue.
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Issue:
Does a state's failure to protect an individual from private violence, after receiving multiple reports of abuse, constitute a deprivation of that individual's liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Opinions:
Majority - Chief Justice Rehnquist
No. A state's failure to protect an individual against private violence does not constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause. The Clause is a limitation on the State’s power to act, not a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security provided by the State. Its purpose is to protect people from the State, not to ensure that the State protects them from each other. The Court's precedents in cases like Estelle v. Gamble and Youngberg v. Romeo establish an affirmative duty to protect only when the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, such as in prison or an institution. In such cases, the State's restraint on the individual's liberty renders him unable to care for himself, triggering a constitutional duty. Here, Joshua was in the custody of his father, a private actor, not the State. The State played no part in creating the dangers Joshua faced, nor did it do anything to make him more vulnerable to them; therefore, it had no constitutional duty to protect him.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
Yes. The Court mischaracterizes the State's role as mere inaction. Wisconsin did not simply 'stand by and do nothing'; it affirmatively acted by creating a comprehensive child-welfare system that channeled all reports of abuse to DSS and relieved ordinary citizens of the responsibility to intervene. By actively intervening in Joshua's life, DSS acquired certain knowledge of the grave danger he faced and effectively confined him to his father's violent home by failing to act. This intervention created a 'special relationship' analogous to those in Estelle and Youngberg, because the State's actions cut off private sources of aid and then the State itself refused to provide aid. Such inaction, after undertaking a vital duty, can be as abusive of power as direct action and should be recognized as a constitutional violation.
Dissenting - Justice Blackmun
Yes. The majority retreats into a 'sterile formalism' by drawing a rigid line between action and inaction, preventing it from recognizing the reality of the State's active intervention in Joshua's life. The Fourteenth Amendment's broad clauses should not be interpreted with such dispassionate reasoning but with a 'sympathetic' reading that comports with fundamental justice. The State knew of the severe danger to which Joshua was exposed and yet did essentially nothing but file reports. This tragic outcome is a 'sad commentary upon American life, and constitutional principles' where the law is interpreted to deny a remedy for such a profound harm. 'Poor Joshua!' deserves the opportunity to have his case considered under the constitutional protection § 1983 is meant to provide.
Analysis:
This decision solidified the principle that the Constitution is primarily a charter of 'negative' liberties, protecting citizens from government action, rather than 'positive' liberties that would require the government to provide services or protection. It narrowly construed the 'special relationship' doctrine, limiting the state's affirmative duty to protect to circumstances of actual physical custody, such as incarceration or involuntary institutionalization. This ruling has made it significantly more difficult for plaintiffs to hold state actors constitutionally liable for failing to prevent harm from private individuals, profoundly impacting civil rights litigation against social service agencies and law enforcement.
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