Descamps v. United States
570 U.S. ____ (2013) (2013)
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Rule of Law:
Sentencing courts may not apply the modified categorical approach to determine if a prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) if the statute of conviction is 'indivisible' and criminalizes a broader range of conduct than the corresponding generic federal offense.
Facts:
- Michael Descamps had a prior conviction for burglary under California Penal Code Ann. § 459.
- The California statute defines burglary as entering certain locations with the intent to commit a crime.
- Unlike the 'generic' definition of burglary used for federal sentencing, the California statute does not require the entry to be unlawful (e.g., 'breaking and entering'); it criminalizes conduct such as a shoplifter lawfully entering a store during business hours.
- Years later, Descamps was convicted in federal court for being a felon in possession of a firearm.
- The U.S. government sought to enhance Descamps' sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).
- The ACCA enhancement required three prior convictions for a 'violent felony,' and the government argued Descamps' California burglary conviction qualified as the generic offense of burglary.
Procedural Posture:
- The U.S. government sought an enhanced sentence for Michael Descamps under ACCA in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Washington.
- The District Court applied the modified categorical approach, examined the transcript of Descamps' prior plea colloquy, and determined he had admitted to conduct satisfying the elements of generic burglary.
- Based on this finding, the District Court ruled the prior conviction was an ACCA predicate and sentenced Descamps to an enhanced term of 262 months in prison.
- Descamps appealed the sentence to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision, relying on circuit precedent in United States v. Aguila-Montes de Oca.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the Circuit Courts of Appeals on this issue.
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Issue:
Does the modified categorical approach permit a sentencing court to examine documents from a prior conviction to determine if the defendant's conduct met the elements of a generic offense, when the statute of conviction is indivisible and criminalizes a broader range of conduct than the generic offense?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Kagan
No. The modified categorical approach is a tool used only to determine which element within a divisible statute formed the basis of a defendant's conviction; it cannot be used to conduct a factual inquiry into a conviction under an indivisible, overbroad statute. This approach serves a limited function: to identify the crime of conviction from a list of statutory alternatives so it can be compared to the generic offense. Applying it to indivisible statutes would transform the inquiry from an elements-based one to a facts-based one, which contradicts ACCA's text focusing on 'convictions' not conduct, raises Sixth Amendment concerns by allowing judicial fact-finding that increases sentences, and creates practical difficulties and unfairness by scrutinizing old, ambiguous records for facts a defendant had no incentive to contest.
Dissenting - Justice Alito
Yes. The court should be able to apply the modified categorical approach to determine if the defendant necessarily admitted or a jury necessarily found facts satisfying the elements of the generic offense, regardless of whether the statute is divisible. The majority's distinction between divisible and indivisible statutes is overly technical, impractical, and will be difficult for lower courts to apply. In this case, the plea colloquy record makes it clear that Descamps admitted to 'breaking and entering,' which satisfies the generic burglary definition, and his conviction should therefore count as an ACCA predicate.
Concurring - Justice Kennedy
This opinion concurs with the majority's conclusion, primarily due to the significant risk that defendants in prior cases pleaded guilty without considering the future ACCA consequences of non-elemental facts. However, the decision creates an 'intrusive demand on the States' by effectively requiring them to amend their criminal statutes to conform to federal definitions. Congress should act to determine if ACCA's design should be modified to address the concerns raised by both the majority and the dissent.
Concurrence - Justice Thomas
This opinion concurs in the judgment only. The entire ACCA sentencing enhancement scheme, which allows judicial fact-finding about prior convictions to increase a defendant's statutory maximum sentence, violates the Sixth Amendment as articulated in Apprendi v. New Jersey. The distinction between 'divisible' and 'indivisible' statutes is irrelevant because a judge should not be making these findings at all. The Court's holding is a step in the right direction because it limits judicial fact-finding, but the underlying constitutional issue remains.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies and narrows the application of the 'modified categorical approach' in federal sentencing. It establishes a bright-line rule that this approach is a tool exclusively for 'divisible' statutes, preventing sentencing courts from delving into the factual circumstances of convictions under overbroad, 'indivisible' statutes. The ruling reinforces that the ACCA inquiry is strictly about the elements of the crime of conviction, not the defendant's specific conduct. This holding places the onus on state legislatures to draft criminal statutes with elements that align with federal generic offenses if those convictions are to serve as predicates for federal sentencing enhancements, potentially invalidating many state convictions for ACCA purposes until such changes are made.
