DeRolph v. State
754 N.E.2d 1184, 93 Ohio St. 3d 309 (2001)
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Rule of Law:
A state's public school financing system violates the constitutional mandate for a 'thorough and efficient' system when its funding formula is calculated in a way that artificially lowers the determined cost of an adequate education. A court may find such a system conditionally constitutional by ordering specific, technical modifications to the statutory formula and severing the unconstitutional provisions.
Facts:
- Ohio's public school funding system historically relied heavily on local property taxes, creating significant funding disparities between districts with high and low property wealth.
- Many students in property-poor districts attended school in dilapidated and unsafe buildings, with some classrooms held in former coal bins.
- These underfunded districts frequently lacked basic educational resources, such as sufficient quantities of textbooks, paper, and other essential supplies.
- Wealth-based disparities resulted in unequal educational opportunities, with poorer districts unable to offer the same quality of programs, teacher salaries, or class sizes as wealthier districts.
- Prior to this ruling, the Supreme Court of Ohio had twice declared the state's school-funding system unconstitutional for failing to provide a 'thorough and efficient' system of common schools.
- In response to the court's prior rulings, the Ohio General Assembly enacted a new funding plan (H.B. 94) intended to remedy the constitutional defects.
Procedural Posture:
- Numerous school districts (plaintiffs), led by Nathan DeRolph, sued the State of Ohio in the Perry County Court of Common Pleas, a trial court, challenging the constitutionality of the school funding system.
- The trial court found the system violated the Ohio Constitution.
- The State appealed to the Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District (an intermediate appellate court), which affirmed the trial court's decision.
- On appeal, in DeRolph v. State (1997) ('DeRolph I'), the Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed, holding that the funding system violated the 'Thorough and Efficient' Clause.
- After the General Assembly passed remedial legislation, the case returned to the Supreme Court of Ohio.
- In DeRolph v. State (2000) ('DeRolph II'), the Supreme Court again found the revised system unconstitutional but retained jurisdiction to allow the General Assembly additional time to comply.
- The General Assembly enacted further remedial legislation (including H.B. 94), which is now under review by the Supreme Court of Ohio.
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Issue:
Does Ohio's statutory school-funding system, as enacted through H.B. 94 and related legislation, violate the 'Thorough and Efficient' Clause of Section 2, Article VI of the Ohio Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Moyer, C.J.
Yes, but it can be rendered constitutional with specific modifications. While the General Assembly has made significant improvements, certain provisions of the school-funding formula are unconstitutional because they artificially and improperly lower the calculated base cost of an adequate education. Specifically, the formula's use of 'wealth screens' to exclude the top five percent of districts, a 'rounding' procedure to include underperforming districts, and an 'echo effect' adjustment are invalid. The court orders these provisions severed and recalculations made retroactive to July 1, 2001. Additionally, the 'parity aid' program designed to help poorer districts must be fully funded by fiscal year 2004, not 2006. With these modifications, the system will meet the constitutional standard, and the court relinquishes its jurisdiction.
Concurring - Douglas, J.
I concur in the majority's well-reasoned decision. The court is not violating the separation of powers doctrine by ordering specific changes; rather, it is fulfilling its duty to sever unconstitutional provisions from a statute, as permitted under R.C. 1.50. This compromise decision is a practical necessity to prevent legislative paralysis and ensure that Ohio's schoolchildren do not lose the significant funding gains achieved through this litigation. Declaring the entire plan unconstitutional would risk a return to previous, inadequate funding levels.
Concurring - Pfeifer, J.
I concur, but the state should go further. While the plan as modified by the court is constitutional, the system continues to rely too heavily on local property taxes. This reliance could be substantially reduced if the state assumed one hundred percent of the funding for school construction and repair, which would be an enormous boost to educational opportunity across Ohio.
Concurring - Lundberg Stratton, J.
I concur in the judgment as a pragmatic compromise to resolve a divisive impasse. I still adhere to my original dissenting view that this case presents a nonjusticiable political question best left to the General Assembly. However, to avoid continued gridlock to the detriment of Ohio's schoolchildren, I join the majority to create a resolution.
Dissenting - Resnick, J.
The majority engages in a 'Machiavellian maneuver' by acting as a superlegislature to rewrite the funding plan, a clear violation of the separation of powers. The plan, even with the majority's judicially legislated amendments, remains unconstitutional because it fails to achieve the 'complete systematic overhaul' mandated by this court in prior decisions. The core problem of overreliance on local property taxes persists, and the majority has abandoned constitutional principles for the sake of expediency and a political compromise.
Dissenting - Sweeney, Sr., J.
I dissent because the current legislation continues to suffer from fundamental structural flaws and does not represent the 'complete systematic overhaul' this court mandated. The system's overreliance on property taxes remains the root cause of its constitutional defects, resulting in continued inequities for children in the poorest districts. The majority's modifications are mere tinkering with a framework that this court has twice struck down, and its relinquishment of jurisdiction is a premature abandonment of its duty.
Dissenting - Cook, J.
This case should be dismissed because it presents a nonjusticiable political question. Defining what constitutes a 'thorough and efficient' system of schools is a policy determination constitutionally committed to the General Assembly, not the judiciary. The majority's decision to order specific legislative action confirms the nonjusticiable nature of the issue and represents a profound violation of the separation of powers doctrine.
Analysis:
This decision represents a significant, if controversial, attempt by a state supreme court to end a protracted battle with the legislative branch over school funding. By ordering specific, technical modifications to the funding formula rather than striking down the entire system, the court created a conditional remedy that blurred the traditional lines of separation of powers. This pragmatic compromise allowed the court to relinquish jurisdiction while ensuring certain funding levels, establishing a precedent for judicial micro-management of legislative policy. The case highlights the inherent tension between judicial review and legislative prerogative in the context of enforcing positive constitutional rights like education.
