Yes. The law is very clear. When Congress wrote the law, it said 'any' drug-related activity could lead to eviction. 'Any' means any—it doesn't matter if the tenant knew or not. This is different from other laws where Congress specifically protected 'innocent owners.' The government is acting like a landlord trying to keep its property safe for everyone. The housing authority doesn't have to evict the tenant, but it has the choice to do so to protect the community.

Yes, the law is very clear. It says that public housing authorities must be allowed to evict tenants if anyone in their household or a guest does any drug crime, even if the tenant didn't know about it. The law says 'any' drug crime by these people is enough for eviction, and it doesn't say the tenant has to know about it. When Congress wanted an exception for owners who didn't know about drug activity in a different law, they put that exception in. But they didn't do that here. The law doesn't say housing authorities have to evict in every case - they can decide based on how serious the crime was and how it affected the community. This makes sense because even if tenants don't know about drug activity, they can still be a threat to their neighbors if they can't control crime by people in their household. The Court said this law doesn't go against the Constitution because the government is acting as a landlord enforcing a lease, not punishing tenants as criminals.

—the Supreme Court held that "42 USC § 1437d (l)(6)[10] unambiguously requires lease terms that vest local public housing authorities with the discretion to evict tenants for the drug-related activity of household members and guests whether or not the tenant knew, or should have known, about the activity."

In Rucker, the petitioners argued that 42 USCA § 1437d (l)(6)[8] required "lease terms that allow a public housing authority to evict a tenant when a member of the tenant's household or a guest engages in drug-related criminal activity, regardless of whether the tenant knew, or had reason to know, of that activity."

Because the Supreme Court has held that tenants may be held responsible for the actions of their guests, the City is likely to establish a rational basis for the Ordinance's application to the Javinsky-Wenzeks.

A] local housing authority may sometimes evict a tenant who had no knowledge of the drug-related activity.

—it observed that the word "any" "has an expansive meaning, that is, one or some, indiscriminately of whatever kind."

—t] he statute does not require the eviction of any tenant who violated the lease provision [,] "but rather" entrusts that decision to the local public housing authorities, who are in the best position to take account of, among other things, the degree to which the housing project suffers from rampant drug-related or violent crime, the seriousness of the offending action, and the …

The Rucker Court stated that "it was reasonable for Congress to permit no-fault evictions in order to `provide public and other federally assisted low-income housing that is decent, safe, and free from illegal drugs.'"

In Rucker, the Oakland Housing Authority threatened to evict the plaintiffs from their federally subsidized housing unit as a result of the fact that household members or guests engaged in drug-related criminal activity.

To avoid a law's plain meaning in the absence of ambiguity "would trench upon the legislative powers vested in Congress by Art. I, § 1, of the Constitution."

—and "reference to legislative history is inappropriate when the text of the statute is unambiguous."

Yes. The plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6) unambiguously requires lease terms that give public housing authorities the discretion to evict tenants for the drug-related activity of household members or guests, without regard to the tenant's knowledge. The statute's use of the term 'any' to modify 'drug-related criminal activity' is expansive and precludes a knowledge requirement. Grammatically, the phrase 'under the tenant's control' applies only to 'other person' and not to 'household member' or 'guest.' Furthermore, Congress's decision to include an 'innocent owner' defense in the civil forfeiture statute, amended in the same Act, but not in this eviction provision, demonstrates its intent to omit such a defense here. The statute does not mandate eviction but grants discretion to local housing authorities to consider the circumstances of each case, which is not an absurd result and does not raise serious constitutional doubts.

Yes, the statute unambiguously requires lease terms that vest local public housing authorities with the discretion to evict tenants for the drug-related activity of household members and guests whether or not the tenant knew, or should have known, about the activity. This is evident from the plain language of the statute, which provides that 'any' drug-related criminal activity by the specified persons shall be cause for termination of tenancy, without imposing any knowledge requirement. Congress's decision not to impose such a requirement, combined with its use of the term 'any' to modify 'drug-related criminal activity,' precludes any knowledge requirement. The Court rejects the Ninth Circuit's interpretation that 'under the tenant's control' modifies the entire list of people whose drug activities may trigger eviction, as this would nonsensically apply to the tenant himself. The Court also notes that Congress included an 'innocent owner' defense in a related civil forfeiture statute but did not do so here, indicating it did not intend to require tenant knowledge for eviction. The Court further explains that the statute does not require eviction in all cases but entrusts that decision to the public housing authorities' discretion based on the severity of the crime and its impact on the community. This is reasonable because even tenants unaware of drug activity pose a threat to other residents if they cannot control crime by household members. Finally, the Court rejects arguments that the statute raises substantial constitutional concerns, as the government is acting as a landlord enforcing a lease provision, not criminally punishing or civilly regulating the tenants.

Department of Housing & Urban Development v. Rucker

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