Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam
591 U. S. ____ (2020) (2020)
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Rule of Law:
A federal statute limiting the scope of habeas corpus review for aliens in expedited removal proceedings does not violate the Suspension Clause or the Due Process Clause, as the historic writ of habeas corpus does not encompass challenges to the substance of credible-fear determinations, and aliens apprehended at the threshold of entry have no constitutional due process rights beyond those provided by statute.
Facts:
- Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam, a Sri Lankan national of Tamil ethnicity, crossed the U.S. southern border without authorization in January 2017.
- A U.S. Border Patrol agent apprehended Thuraissigiam approximately 25 yards inside the U.S. border.
- Thuraissigiam claimed he feared returning to Sri Lanka because a group of men had previously abducted and severely beaten him.
- During an interview with an asylum officer, Thuraissigiam stated he did not know his attackers' identities or motives and did not explicitly link the assault to his race, political opinions, or other protected characteristics.
- An asylum officer credited Thuraissigiam's account of the assault but found he lacked a 'credible fear of persecution' under the statutory definition because he failed to establish a nexus to a protected ground for asylum.
- A supervising asylum officer and, subsequently, an Immigration Judge on de novo review, affirmed the negative credible-fear determination.
Procedural Posture:
- Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California, the court of first instance.
- The District Court dismissed the petition, holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) statutorily barred judicial review of his credible-fear determination and that this limitation did not violate the Suspension Clause.
- Thuraissigiam (appellant) appealed the dismissal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court, holding that § 1252(e)(2) was unconstitutional as applied to Thuraissigiam because it violated the Suspension Clause and that he possessed procedural due process rights.
- The Department of Homeland Security (petitioner) petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court, the highest court, for a writ of certiorari, which was granted.
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Issue:
Does 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2), a federal statute that limits habeas corpus review for aliens in expedited removal proceedings to certain narrow inquiries, violate the Suspension Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as applied to an asylum-seeker apprehended shortly after entering the United States?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Alito
No. The federal statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2), does not unconstitutionally suspend the writ of habeas corpus or violate the Due Process Clause as applied to respondent. The Suspension Clause protects the writ of habeas corpus as it existed in 1789, which was a vehicle to secure release from unlawful physical confinement, not to obtain further administrative review of an asylum claim or to gain authorization to remain in the country. Respondent's petition seeks a remedy—vacatur of his removal order and a new asylum hearing—that falls outside the traditional core of habeas relief. Furthermore, under more than a century of precedent, an alien at the threshold of initial entry has no constitutional due process rights regarding his application for admission beyond the procedures that Congress has provided by statute. Because Thuraissigiam was apprehended just 25 yards from the border, he is treated as an 'applicant for admission' who has not effected an entry and is therefore only entitled to the statutory 'credible fear' process, not additional constitutional protections.
Concurrence - Justice Thomas
No. The statute does not violate the Suspension Clause. The original meaning of the Suspension Clause was to protect against discretionary executive detention without trial. A 'suspension' of the writ was understood as a legislative act granting the executive power to detain individuals based on mere suspicion of a crime or dangerousness. The expedited removal statute is not a suspension in this sense because it requires an immigration officer to make a determination of 'inadmissibility' based on specific statutory criteria, such as lack of valid entry documents, not on mere suspicion. Therefore, the statute at issue does not implicate the core concern of the Suspension Clause.
Concurrence - Justice Breyer
No. The statute is constitutional as applied in this specific case, and the Court should not issue a broader ruling. Even assuming the Suspension Clause applies, the constitutionally required scope of habeas review would not extend to Thuraissigiam's claims. First, his status as an alien apprehended moments after entry means any constitutional floor for review is low. Second, his claims, though framed as legal, are essentially factual challenges to the immigration officials' findings about his attackers and their motives, which Congress may constitutionally make unreviewable. His procedural claims are too technical and fine-grained to fall within the scope of constitutionally required habeas review under these circumstances.
Dissenting - Justice Sotomayor
Yes. The statute is unconstitutional as applied because it strips the courts of their ability to check unlawful executive detention, a core function of the writ of habeas corpus. The majority mischaracterizes respondent's claim; he alleges that immigration officials made a legal error by misapplying the statutory 'credible fear' standard, a classic question of law that has been reviewable on habeas for over a century. Historical practice, particularly during the 'finality era,' demonstrates that courts consistently reviewed legal and constitutional claims in immigration cases despite jurisdiction-stripping statutes, doing so to avoid violating the Suspension Clause. Furthermore, the majority wrongly concludes that an alien physically present in the U.S. has no due process rights. The Fifth Amendment applies to all 'persons' within the United States, and denying any constitutional process to individuals like respondent paves the way for arbitrary administrative adjudications.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the availability of habeas corpus for asylum seekers in expedited removal proceedings, effectively insulating negative 'credible fear' determinations from judicial review on questions of law and procedure. The ruling reaffirms and arguably expands the 'entry fiction' doctrine, holding that mere physical presence after an illegal entry does not trigger constitutional due process rights regarding admission. By classifying challenges to the application of asylum law as falling outside the 'core' of habeas, the Court grants Congress extensive power to limit judicial oversight of executive immigration decisions at the border, impacting the separation of powers and potentially increasing the risk of erroneous removals.
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