Dennis H. Hagenow and Rosalee A. Hagenow v. Betty L. Schmidt
2014 WL 497267, 842 N.W.2d 661, 2014 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 11 (2014)
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Rule of Law:
A sudden, unforeseeable medical emergency can constitute a legal excuse for a statutory traffic violation, negating a finding of negligence, even if the driver was unaware of the medical event at the exact moment of the accident. Instructional errors in jury instructions are subject to a harmless error analysis, meaning that even if technically flawed, they will not lead to reversal if the complaining party was not prejudiced by the error.
Facts:
- On November 10, 2008, Betty Schmidt, then age seventy-five, was driving her 1999 Buick LeSabre east on University Avenue in Cedar Falls, Iowa.
- The weather was clear and the roads were dry, and Schmidt perceived no problem with her vision or health that would impair her driving.
- Schmidt saw a red traffic light at the intersection with Cedar Heights Drive but did not see Dennis Hagenow's 2008 GMC Sierra pickup truck stopped in the right turn lane in front of her.
- Schmidt drove her vehicle into the rear of Hagenow's truck, causing disabling damage to both vehicles.
- An hour after arriving at the Sartori Hospital Emergency Room, Schmidt realized she was unable to see to her left side.
- Medical staff diagnosed Schmidt with left homonymous hemianopsia, and neurologist Dr. Ivo Bekavac concluded she suffered an acute ischemic infarct (stroke) in her right occipital lobe that caused the vision loss.
- Dr. Bekavac initially noted in Schmidt's chart that it was unclear whether the stroke happened before or after the accident but later clarified his belief, based on available information, that the stroke most likely preceded the accident.
- Schmidt had no forewarning of the stroke and had never previously suffered one.
Procedural Posture:
- Dennis and Rosalee Hagenow filed a personal injury action against Betty Schmidt in the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County.
- Schmidt filed an answer denying negligence and pleading affirmative defenses, including sudden medical emergency and act of God.
- The district court held an unreported hearing, orally advising counsel it would allow Dr. Bekavac to testify and directed the parties to cooperate in scheduling depositions of Drs. Bekavac and Friedgood before trial.
- The district court filed written orders denying the Hagenows’ motions to exclude Dr. Bekavac’s testimony, noting that Schmidt had informed the Hagenows of Dr. Bekavac’s changed opinion more than thirty days prior to trial and offering a continuance, which the Hagenows declined.
- The district court denied both parties’ motions for summary judgment, finding that conflicting expert opinions regarding the timing of Schmidt’s stroke created a genuine issue of material fact for the sudden emergency defense.
- A jury returned a verdict in favor of Schmidt, finding she was not at fault.
- The Hagenows moved for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or new trial, arguing Schmidt failed to prove the stroke transpired prior to the collision or impaired her operation of the vehicle, which the district court denied.
- The Hagenows appealed the judgment to the Iowa Court of Appeals.
- The Iowa Court of Appeals concluded that the evidence supported a defense of legal excuse but reversed the judgment and remanded the case for a new trial based on erroneous wording in the sudden emergency instruction.
- Schmidt applied for further review with the Iowa Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Is it reversible error for a trial court to admit expert testimony clarifying a treating physician's opinion on the timing of a sudden medical event, and to instruct the jury on a sudden medical emergency defense, when the defendant was unaware of the medical emergency at the moment of impact but the instruction's wording arguably made the defense more difficult to prove and was thus non-prejudicial?
Opinions:
Majority - Waterman, Justice
No, the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Dr. Bekavac’s testimony, nor was there reversible error in submitting the sudden emergency instruction. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court acted within its discretion by allowing Dr. Bekavac's expert medical opinion, despite his earlier uncertainty, because Schmidt disclosed his updated opinion 67 days before trial, exceeding the 30-day minimum required by Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.508(3). The Hagenows failed to demonstrate prejudice, as they were able to retain a rebuttal expert (Dr. Friedgood), depose both experts before trial, and declined an offered continuance, thereby fulfilling the criteria for assessing discovery violations set out in cases like Whitley v. C.R. Pharmacy Serv., Inc. The Court reiterated that exclusion of an expert is an extreme sanction justified only when prejudice would otherwise result. Furthermore, the Court held that the evidence was sufficient to submit a legal-excuse defense based on Schmidt's sudden medical emergency. Dr. Bekavac's testimony, supported by Dr. Friedgood's partial agreement on the nature of the vision loss, provided substantial evidence that the stroke occurred before the accident and caused Schmidt's vision impairment, preventing her from perceiving the Hagenows' vehicle. The Court acknowledged the court of appeals' concern that the sudden emergency instruction's wording, requiring an 'unforeseen combination of circumstances that calls for immediate action,' might be inapt for a situation where the driver was unaware of the medical event and thus unable to take immediate action. However, the Court deferred consideration of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm, sections 9, 11, and 15, for future cases. Crucially, the Court determined that any error in the wording of the sudden emergency instruction was harmless because it effectively made the defense more difficult for Schmidt to prove. Therefore, the Hagenows, as the complaining party, were not prejudiced by the alleged error, as supported by cases like Wells v. Enter. Rent-A-Car Midwest. The jury's verdict, finding Schmidt not at fault, indicated they found her stroke caused the accident, consistent with the available evidence. Thus, the district court correctly denied the Hagenows’ motion for a new trial.
Analysis:
This case provides significant guidance on the application of discovery rules regarding expert testimony, particularly for treating physicians whose opinions evolve, emphasizing that timely disclosure and the absence of prejudice (especially when a continuance is declined) will typically prevent exclusion. It also clarifies the appellate standard for instructional errors, underscoring that such errors are harmless if they do not prejudice the complaining party or, as here, make the opposing party's defense more arduous. Finally, while deferring explicit adoption of the Restatement (Third) of Torts, the decision implicitly acknowledges the complexities of applying traditional 'sudden emergency' doctrine to cases of unforeseen medical incapacitation, suggesting a future evolution in how such defenses are framed in Iowa law.
