Demelus v. King Motor Co. of Fort Lauderdale
2009 WL 5126239, 24 So. 3d 759, 2009 Fla. App. LEXIS 20402 (2009)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
An automobile dealership does not owe a duty of care to a third-party injured by a stolen vehicle if the manner of theft was not legally foreseeable and the dealership's existing security measures did not affirmatively create an unreasonable risk of harm.
Facts:
- King Motor Company of Fort Lauderdale (King Motor) operated an 11-acre automobile dealership with several hundred vehicles, five showrooms, and four buildings for vehicle repair and maintenance.
- King Motor secured its premises at night with an evening security guard, metal perimeter posts, locked and chained entranceways with blocker vehicles, locked vehicles, and keys stored inside locked buildings, following a strict key security policy.
- During the six years prior to May 5, 2006, King Motor experienced 36 vehicle break-ins and thefts, none of which involved a criminal breaking into a locked showroom to steal keys, then ramming gates or blocker vehicles to exit.
- On May 5, 2006, a juvenile gang smashed hurricane-proof windows of a locked showroom, broke into interior offices, ransacked cubicles, opened locked drawers, kicked in doors, and broke into the room and box where keys were kept to obtain keys for three vehicles.
- After gaining access to the vehicles, the thieves either rammed or moved the blocker vehicle that obstructed the gate and rammed open the chained, locked gate to exit King Motor’s premises.
- One of the stolen vehicles was subsequently involved in an automobile accident with Onondieu Demelus several blocks away from King Motor’s dealership, causing Demelus injury.
Procedural Posture:
- Onondieu Demelus sued King Motor Company of Fort Lauderdale in the trial court (court of first instance) for damages he sustained in an automobile accident involving a vehicle stolen from King Motor.
- King Motor moved for summary judgment, asserting that the theft of the vehicle was unforeseeable and therefore it owed no duty of care.
- The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of King Motor.
- Onondieu Demelus (appellant) appealed the trial court’s order granting summary judgment to the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does an automobile dealership owe a duty of care to a third-party injured by a stolen vehicle when the theft involved a sophisticated forced entry into secured premises and the dealership had implemented security measures to prevent such thefts?
Opinions:
Majority - Polen, J.
No, an automobile dealership does not owe a duty of care to a third-party injured by a stolen vehicle when the theft involved a sophisticated forced entry into secured premises and the dealership had implemented security measures to prevent such thefts, because the specific manner of the theft was not legally foreseeable and the dealership did not create the risk of harm. The court affirmed the trial court's summary judgment for King Motor, finding that the manner of the theft, involving a violent break-in, extensive property damage, and forceful exit, was not legally foreseeable, especially given King Motor's robust security measures. The court distinguished this case from Vining v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc. and Hewitt v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., where defendants either left keys in ignitions or made them readily available through employee complicity, thus creating a foreseeable zone of risk. In contrast, King Motor's actions guarded against theft, and it was not complicit. The court also differentiated United States v. Stevens, which involved ultra-hazardous materials (anthrax) where negligent security could be viewed as an affirmative act creating a risk. An automobile, unlike anthrax, is not a dangerous instrumentality when locked and parked. King Motor's alleged security deficiencies were characterized as omissions (failure to act more), not commissions (affirmative acts creating risk), and did not worsen Demelus's pre-existing risk of injury from driving on public roads. Since prior thefts at King Motor did not involve this level of forced entry and exit, the specific criminal conduct was unforeseeable as a matter of law.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the application of the "foreseeable zone of risk" doctrine in Florida negligence law, particularly regarding intervening criminal acts. It establishes a high bar for imposing a duty of care on property owners for third-party injuries caused by stolen property when substantial security measures are in place and the specific method of theft is unprecedented. The ruling reinforces that the defendant's conduct must create the risk, rather than merely fail to prevent an extreme, unforeseeable criminal act, emphasizing the importance of the manner of the criminal act in determining foreseeability. This decision limits the scope of liability for businesses facing determined criminal activity despite reasonable preventative efforts.
