Delgadillo v. Carmichael
1947 U.S. LEXIS 1644, 332 US 388, 68 S. Ct. 10 (1947)
Rule of Law:
An alien's return to the United States does not constitute a statutory "entry" under the Immigration Act if their departure and presence on foreign soil were unintentional, involuntary, and caused by exigencies beyond their control.
Facts:
- The Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, legally entered the United States in 1923 and resided there continuously.
- In 1942, during World War II, the Petitioner served as a crew member on an American merchant ship traveling from Los Angeles to New York.
- The ship was torpedoed by enemy forces, and the Petitioner was rescued and taken to Havana, Cuba, for safety.
- The Petitioner remained in Cuba for one week under the care of the American Consul before returning to the United States via Miami on July 19, 1942.
- In 1944, the Petitioner was convicted of second-degree robbery in California and sentenced to imprisonment.
- Immigration authorities sought to deport the Petitioner based on a statute mandating deportation for crimes involving moral turpitude committed within five years of an alien's "entry" into the United States.
- The authorities claimed the Petitioner's return from Cuba in 1942 constituted a new "entry," bringing the 1944 crime within the five-year statutory window.
Procedural Posture:
- Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the District Court challenging the deportation order.
- The District Court granted the petition and discharged the Petitioner.
- The Respondent (Government) appealed the decision to the Circuit Court of Appeals.
- The Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District Court's decision.
- Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a resident alien's return to the United States constitute an "entry" under the Immigration Act of 1917 when their presence in a foreign country was unintentional and caused solely by a wartime shipwreck and subsequent rescue?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Douglas
No. The Court held that an alien's return to the United States following an involuntary and accidental presence on foreign soil does not constitute an "entry" under the Immigration Act. The Court reasoned that while previous precedents established that coming from a foreign country generally constitutes an entry, those cases involved voluntary departures where the alien planned to visit a foreign port. In this case, the Petitioner was "catapulted" into the ocean and taken to Cuba solely by the necessity of rescue. Relying on the logic of Di Pasquale v. Karnuth, the Court concluded that Congress did not intend to subject aliens to the "sport of chance" or attach the severe penalty of deportation to the "perils of the sea." Because the Petitioner's itinerary was forced upon him by the exigencies of war and he never intended to leave the United States, his return cannot be legally classified as an entry.
Analysis:
This decision significantly narrows the legal definition of "entry" in immigration law by introducing an exception for involuntary departures. By distinguishing between voluntary travel and presence on foreign soil caused by "fortuitous circumstances" (such as shipwrecks or war), the Court protects permanent residents from losing their status due to accidents beyond their control. This establishes a precedent that statutory interpretation should avoid harsh, capricious results that Congress likely did not intend, particularly when the stakes involve the "banishment" of deportation.
