Delaware v. Fensterer
474 U.S. 15 (1985)
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Rule of Law:
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not a cross-examination that is effective in whatever way or to whatever extent the defense might wish. The admission of an expert witness's opinion testimony is not a constitutional violation simply because the expert cannot recall the basis for their opinion.
Facts:
- William Fensterer was prosecuted for the murder of his fiancée, Stephanie Ann Swift.
- The State's theory was that Fensterer strangled Swift with a cat leash.
- To connect the leash to the murder, the prosecution presented testimony from FBI Special Agent Allen Robillard, a hair analysis expert.
- Agent Robillard testified that two hairs found on the leash were similar to Swift's and that one of them had been forcibly removed.
- Robillard stated there were three scientific methods to determine forcible removal: the presence of a follicular tag, a misshapen root, or a skin sheath.
- On both direct and cross-examination, Agent Robillard could not recall which of the three methods he had used to conclude the hair was forcibly removed.
- The defense presented its own expert, Dr. Peter DeForest, who testified that Robillard had previously told him his conclusion was based on a follicular tag, a premise Dr. DeForest then argued was scientifically unsupported.
Procedural Posture:
- William Fensterer was convicted of murder in a Delaware state trial court.
- During the trial, the court admitted the testimony of the prosecution's expert witness, Agent Robillard, over the defense's objection that his inability to recall the basis of his opinion precluded effective cross-examination.
- Fensterer (as appellant) appealed the conviction to the Delaware Supreme Court (the state's highest court).
- The Delaware Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the admission of Agent Robillard's testimony violated Fensterer's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.
- The State of Delaware (as petitioner) petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to review the Delaware Supreme Court's decision.
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Issue:
Does the admission of an expert witness's opinion testimony violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation when the expert is unable to recall on the stand the specific basis for forming that opinion?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No, the admission of the expert's testimony did not violate Fensterer's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. The Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not a perfect or successful one. The trial court did not limit the scope of cross-examination; rather, the witness's own memory lapse was the impediment. The defense was given a full and fair opportunity to probe the witness's memory, exposing his forgetfulness to the jury and thereby calling his credibility into question. This satisfies the clause's requirements, as the witness testified under oath, in the defendant's presence, and was subject to cross-examination, allowing the jury to assess the weight of his testimony. The witness's inability to recall the basis for his opinion goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility under the Constitution.
Concurring - Justice Stevens
Although not persuaded that the Federal Constitution was violated, the issue is much closer to the question reserved in California v. Green than the majority suggests. The Court's summary reversal of a state supreme court stultifies the orderly development of the law in an area where states should have some latitude. However, because the Court has chosen to decide the case summarily and the state court remains free to reinstate its judgment on state law grounds, I reluctantly concur in the judgment.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the boundary between a constitutional violation and a simple matter of witness credibility under the Confrontation Clause. It establishes that a witness's memory failure, in itself, does not render their testimony inadmissible so long as the defense is not procedurally hindered from exposing that weakness. This distinguishes between court-imposed limitations on cross-examination, which are constitutionally suspect, and inherent limitations within a witness's testimony. The ruling reinforces that the jury's role is to weigh witness credibility, including forgetfulness, and that the Confrontation Clause is a procedural guarantee of opportunity, not a substantive guarantee of a particular outcome from that opportunity.
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