Delaney v. Clifton
2002 Ore. App. LEXIS 387, 41 P.3d 1099, 180 Or. App. 119 (2002)
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Rule of Law:
A therapist does not owe a professional duty of care to a non-patient spouse for purely emotional distress arising from the therapist's treatment of the patient, absent a special relationship or a legal source of liability beyond general foreseeability. Furthermore, a non-patient's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) against a therapist, based on the therapist's treatment of a patient, requires allegations of conduct that is an 'extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct,' which is unlikely to be met by allegations of mere negligence or when no special relationship exists between the plaintiff and the therapist.
Facts:
- Plaintiff and Lee Ann Delaney were married from 1985 to 1995 and had three children.
- In 1993, Lee Ann began attending lectures and reading books about multiple personality disorder (MPD) and satanic cults, leading her to suspect she suffered from MPD and was a victim of satanic ritual abuse.
- Plaintiff also became convinced of the existence of a satanic cult, their involvement, Lee Ann's MPD, and the validity of treatment for the diagnosis.
- Later in 1993, Lee Ann retained defendant Mary Ellen Farley, a professional counselor specializing in MPD and satanic ritual abuse, who used 'memory retrieval' treatment.
- During treatment, Lee Ann described 'alter personalities' that surfaced in response to external stimuli and traumatic memories of torture, burial of children, and ritualistic scars, which Farley continually assured her were accurate.
- In July 1994, Farley referred Lee Ann to defendant Carol Clifton, a clinical psychologist specializing in dissociative disorders and satanic ritual abuse, who diagnosed Lee Ann with MPD and began treatment to 'integrate' her alter personalities.
- Clifton associated a 'cult deprogrammer' to aid in therapy and urged plaintiff to move out of the family home for two weeks to facilitate the deprogrammer's work.
- Plaintiff alleged that Lee Ann’s paranoia and delusions were caused by defendants' treatment methods, which in turn strained the marriage and ultimately caused Lee Ann and plaintiff to divorce.
Procedural Posture:
- Plaintiff sued defendants Mary Ellen Farley and Carol Clifton in trial court, alleging professional malpractice/negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED).
- The trial court dismissed plaintiff's professional malpractice/negligence claims for failure to state a claim (pursuant to ORCP 21 A(8)).
- The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's IIED claims, concluding that plaintiff, as a 'third-party' victim who was not present when defendants' conduct occurred, could not recover.
- Plaintiff assigned error to both rulings in an appeal to the Oregon Court of Appeals.
- Defendants cross-assigned error to the trial court’s failure to dismiss the IIED claims in the Oregon Court of Appeals.
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Issue:
1. Does a therapist owe a professional duty of care to a patient's non-patient spouse for purely emotional distress suffered by the spouse due to the therapist's diagnosis and treatment of the patient, absent a special relationship between the therapist and the spouse or a specific legal source of liability? 2. Does a plaintiff, who is not the therapist's patient, adequately state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) against a therapist based on the therapist's treatment of the patient, when the alleged conduct is essentially negligent and no special relationship exists between the plaintiff and the therapist?
Opinions:
Majority - Linder, J.
No, a therapist does not owe a professional duty of care to a patient's non-patient spouse for purely emotional distress. To state a claim for professional malpractice or ordinary negligence seeking redress for emotional injury alone, a plaintiff must allege a particular duty arising from a special relationship between the defendant and the plaintiff, one distinct from the general duty to prevent foreseeable harm, or a legal source of liability beyond mere foreseeability. Plaintiff's complaint alleged only foreseeability of harm to his relationship with Lee Ann, not a special relationship with the therapists or any other legal source for liability for purely psychic injury. The court declined to depart from settled Oregon tort jurisprudence by adopting a broad 'national trend' of expanded therapist liability to third parties for emotional distress. No, the plaintiff did not adequately state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). The court affirmed the dismissal on the alternative ground that the complaint failed to allege conduct constituting an 'extraordinary transgression of the bounds of socially tolerable conduct.' While Oregon has adopted the basic elements of IIED, the question of whether 'third-party' IIED claims should be recognized, and with what limitations (e.g., 'presence' requirement), remains unresolved. The court did not need to resolve this broader question but found the alleged conduct insufficient for outrageousness. A key factor in assessing outrageousness is whether a special relationship exists between the defendant and the plaintiff, which was absent here. The court emphasized that imposing heightened obligations on therapists to non-patients would compromise the confidential therapist-patient relationship, forcing therapists to potentially prioritize third-party emotional well-being over the patient's interests. The conduct was also not alleged to be outrageous from Lee Ann's perspective, as she voluntarily participated in therapy and was not alleged to be dissatisfied. The complaint merely incorporated allegations of negligent diagnosis and treatment, which is insufficient for IIED, as such claims require deliberate, intentional conduct, often with an ulterior motive or to exploit vulnerability, not merely negligent acts. The combination of plaintiff's outsider status, Lee Ann's voluntary participation, and the nature of the allegations as negligence rather than intentional outrageous conduct, meant the claim failed as a matter of law.
Analysis:
This case establishes significant limitations on claims against therapists by non-patients for emotional distress. It reinforces that, in Oregon, foreseeability alone is insufficient for negligence claims for purely emotional injuries without a direct special relationship or specific legal duty. Crucially, for IIED claims, the ruling sets a high bar for 'outrageous' conduct, particularly for non-patients, by highlighting that allegations of negligence are inadequate and emphasizing the protection of the therapist-patient relationship. Future cases seeking to hold therapists liable to third parties for emotional distress will face considerable hurdles, requiring either a direct special relationship or demonstrably egregious, intentional conduct, moving beyond mere allegations of negligent treatment.
