DeFunis v. Odegaard
416 U.S. 312 (1974)
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Rule of Law:
Under Article III of the Constitution, a case is considered moot and federal courts lack jurisdiction to hear it if a judicial determination can no longer affect the rights of the litigants because the plaintiff has already been granted the relief sought and subsequent events make it impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief whatever.
Facts:
- In 1971, Marco DeFunis, Jr. applied for admission to the University of Washington Law School, a state-operated institution.
- The Law School received approximately 1,600 applications for an incoming class limited to 150 students.
- The Law School's admissions policy gave preferential treatment to applicants from certain minority ethnic groups (black, Chicano, American Indian, or Filipino) to increase their representation.
- DeFunis, a white applicant, was placed on a waiting list and ultimately denied admission.
- DeFunis believed he was denied admission because of the preferential admissions policy, which he alleged discriminated against him on account of his race.
Procedural Posture:
- Marco DeFunis, Jr. sued the University of Washington in a Washington state trial court, alleging the law school's admissions policy was unconstitutional.
- The trial court agreed with DeFunis and granted a mandatory injunction compelling the Law School to admit him.
- The University of Washington (respondents) appealed the trial court's decision to the Supreme Court of Washington.
- The Supreme Court of Washington (the state's highest court) reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the admissions policy was constitutional.
- DeFunis (petitioner) petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari.
- Justice Douglas, as Circuit Justice, stayed the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court, which allowed DeFunis to remain enrolled in law school pending the U.S. Supreme Court's final disposition of the case.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Supreme Court of Washington.
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Issue:
Is a constitutional challenge to a law school's admissions policy moot when the plaintiff, who was admitted under a lower court's injunction, is in his final term of study and is guaranteed by the school to graduate regardless of the Supreme Court's decision?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
Yes. The case is moot because there is no longer a live case or controversy for the Court to adjudicate. The federal judiciary's power under Article III is limited to deciding questions that can affect the rights of the litigants. Here, DeFunis has been admitted to the law school, is registered for his final term, and the university has represented that he will be allowed to graduate regardless of the outcome of this case. Since DeFunis has already received the core relief he sought—admission to and completion of law school—a decision on the constitutionality of the admissions policy can have no practical effect on his rights. The controversy is no longer 'definite and concrete.' Furthermore, the exception for issues 'capable of repetition, yet evading review' does not apply because the issue will not be repeated for DeFunis himself, and there is no reason to believe that future challenges by other students would not reach the Court in a timely manner.
Dissenting - Justice Brennan
No. The case is not moot because DeFunis's graduation is not an absolute certainty. There remains a possibility that an unforeseen event, such as illness, academic failure, or economic necessity, could prevent him from graduating at the end of the term. If that were to occur, he would once again be subject to the challenged admissions policy to re-enroll. The university's assurances do not eliminate this contingency and therefore do not carry the 'heavy burden' of demonstrating mootness. Furthermore, the Court disserves the public interest by avoiding a decision on a major constitutional question of widespread importance that is certain to return to the Court.
Dissenting - Justice Douglas
No. The case is not moot and the Court should reach the merits because of the significance of the issues raised. Justice Douglas then proceeded to analyze the merits, arguing that any racial classification is subject to strict scrutiny. He criticized the Law School's use of the LSAT as potentially culturally biased and argued that the two-track admissions system, which compared minority applicants only against each other, was unconstitutional. He contended that the Equal Protection Clause requires a racially neutral process where each applicant is judged on their individual merits, which can include consideration of overcoming past hardships, but not a preference based solely on race. He would have remanded the case for a new trial to determine if the selection was racially neutral.
Analysis:
This case is a landmark in the law of justiciability, specifically the doctrine of mootness. By dismissing the case on procedural grounds, the Supreme Court famously avoided rendering a decision on the constitutionality of affirmative action in university admissions. This decision underscored the Court's strict adherence to the Article III 'case or controversy' requirement, refusing to issue an advisory opinion even on a pressing national issue. It effectively delayed a substantive ruling on racial preferences for several years until Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978), leaving universities and lower courts without guidance in the interim.
