Debs v. United States
249 U.S. 211 (1919)
Rule of Law:
Speech that has a natural tendency and a reasonably probable effect of obstructing the military's recruiting and enlistment service, when made with the specific intent to do so, is not protected by the First Amendment and can be punished under the Espionage Act.
Facts:
- Eugene V. Debs was a prominent socialist leader and political figure in the United States.
- On June 16, 1918, in Canton, Ohio, Debs delivered a public, anti-war speech to a large assembly of people.
- During the speech, Debs praised several individuals, including Ruthenberg, Baker, and Wagenknecht, who had been convicted and imprisoned for offenses related to obstructing the military draft.
- Debs told his audience that these individuals were paying the penalty for their devotion to the working class and for seeking better conditions for mankind.
- He also spoke sympathetically of Kate Richards O’Hare and Rose Pastor Stokes, who were convicted of obstructing enlistment, stating that if Stokes was guilty, so was he.
- Debs stated that the 'master class has always declared the war and the subject class has always fought the battles,' and told the working-class audience they were 'fit for something better than slavery and cannon fodder.'
- Prior to the speech, Debs had expressed his approval of the Socialist Party's 'Anti-war Proclamation and Program,' which called for 'continuous, active, and public opposition to the war.'
Procedural Posture:
- The United States government indicted Eugene V. Debs in a federal trial court for violating the Espionage Act of 1917.
- The indictment was narrowed to two counts: attempting to cause insubordination in the military and attempting to obstruct military recruitment.
- Debs filed a demurrer to the indictment, arguing the statute was unconstitutional under the First Amendment; the trial court overruled the demurrer.
- A jury trial was held, and the jury found Debs guilty.
- The trial court sentenced Debs to ten years in prison on each of two counts, to be served concurrently.
- Debs appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of the United States.
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Issue:
Does a speech that condemns a war and expresses sympathy for individuals convicted of draft-related offenses, delivered with the intent and natural tendency to obstruct military recruitment, violate the Espionage Act of 1917 and therefore lack First Amendment protection?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Holmes
Yes. A speech delivered with the intent and natural tendency to obstruct military recruitment violates the Espionage Act and is not protected by the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that while the main theme of Debs's speech was socialism, its manifest intent in certain passages was to obstruct the recruiting service. The Court found evidence of this intent in Debs's praise and expressed sympathy for specific individuals who had been convicted of obstructing the draft, as this effectively endorsed their unlawful actions. The Court concluded that the opposition to the war was expressed in a way that its natural and intended effect would be to obstruct recruiting. Citing its recent decision in Schenck v. United States, the Court affirmed that such speech is not protected by the First Amendment, especially during wartime. The admission of the 'Anti-war Proclamation' was proper to show Debs's intent, and the jury was correctly instructed that it must find both a natural tendency to obstruct and a specific intent to do so.
Analysis:
This case, decided shortly after Schenck v. United States, further solidified the judiciary's willingness to restrict First Amendment rights during wartime in the interest of national security. The decision is significant for focusing on the 'natural tendency and reasonably probable effect' of speech, a standard seen as less protective than the 'clear and present danger' test articulated in Schenck. By allowing a conviction based on inferred intent from general anti-war rhetoric and praise for draft resisters, the Court expanded the scope of speech punishable under the Espionage Act. This ruling empowered the government to prosecute political dissenters and demonstrated that even indirect criticism of the war effort could be deemed a criminal act if a jury could infer a specific obstructive intent.
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