De Cicco v. Schweizer
117 N.E. 807 (1917)
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Rule of Law:
A promise by a third party made to one or both parties of a contract to induce them not to mutually rescind their contract is supported by valid consideration. The parties' forbearance from their legal right to rescind constitutes a detriment sufficient to enforce the third party's promise.
Facts:
- Blanche Josephine Schweizer was engaged to be married to Count Oberto Gulinelli.
- On January 16, 1902, four days before the wedding, Blanche's father, Joseph Schweizer, executed a written agreement with Count Gulinelli.
- In the agreement, Schweizer promised that in consideration of the marriage, he would pay his daughter Blanche an annuity of $2,500 for the duration of his life.
- Blanche and Count Gulinelli were married on January 20, 1902.
- On the day of the marriage, Schweizer made the first payment to his daughter.
- Schweizer continued to make the annual payments for ten years, until 1912, when he failed to make the payment for that year.
Procedural Posture:
- Blanche Schweizer and her husband assigned their right to the annuity payments to the plaintiff.
- The plaintiff sued Joseph Schweizer in the trial court to recover the unpaid 1912 installment.
- At trial, both parties moved for a directed verdict, consenting for the trial judge to act as the trier of fact.
- The trial judge found in favor of the plaintiff.
- The defendant, Joseph Schweizer, appealed the judgment, bringing the case before this court.
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Issue:
Does a third party's promise to pay an annuity to an engaged couple, made to induce them to marry, lack consideration because the couple was already under a pre-existing legal duty to marry each other?
Opinions:
Majority - Cardozo, J.
No, the promise does not lack consideration. A promise made by a third party to induce the parties of a contract not to exercise their power to mutually rescind is enforceable. The defendant's promise was a unilateral contract, where the consideration was the act of marriage. While the engaged couple had a duty to each other, they were free by common consent to terminate their engagement. By forbearing from this right to rescind and assuming the responsibilities of marriage in reliance on the defendant’s promise, they incurred a legal detriment. This detriment is sufficient consideration to make the promise enforceable, especially given public policy's strong interest in upholding marriage settlements.
Concurring - Crane, J.
No. While I agree with the majority's reasoning on consideration, the agreement is more appropriately viewed as a marriage settlement. Public policy strongly favors upholding marriage settlements, and they are often treated as exceptions to the strict, technical rules of consideration. The marriage itself is the consideration for the settlement. The formal document, executed just before the wedding and stating the marriage as the reason for the promise, was intended to induce the marriage and became binding once the marriage occurred.
Analysis:
This case creates a significant exception to the pre-existing duty rule in contract law. It distinguishes between a promise to induce performance of a duty owed to the promisor (generally invalid) and a promise by a third party to induce performance of a duty owed between two other parties. The court's key insight is that while the engaged couple owed a duty to each other, they collectively retained the legal power to mutually rescind their agreement. The forbearance of this right to rescind, induced by the third-party promise, constitutes valid consideration, making the promise enforceable.
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