Day v. McDonough
547 U.S. 198 (2006)
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Rule of Law:
A federal district court has the discretion, but not the obligation, to dismiss a state prisoner's habeas corpus petition as untimely under AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations on its own initiative (sua sponte), even if the State has mistakenly conceded the petition's timeliness.
Facts:
- Patrick A. Day was convicted of second-degree murder in a Florida state court.
- Day's sentence was affirmed on direct appeal on December 21, 1999.
- Day did not seek review from the U.S. Supreme Court, and his time to do so expired on March 20, 2000, starting the one-year clock for a federal habeas petition.
- 353 days later, Day sought state postconviction relief, which paused the one-year clock.
- The Florida appellate court issued its mandate denying Day's postconviction relief on December 3, 2002, restarting the clock.
- 36 days later, on January 8, 2003, Day filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court.
- The total untolled time that had passed was 389 days (353 + 36), exceeding the one-year limit under the controlling circuit precedent.
Procedural Posture:
- Patrick A. Day filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida.
- The State of Florida, in its answer, erroneously agreed that the petition was timely.
- A Federal Magistrate Judge, noticing the State's calculation error, issued an order for Day to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed as untimely.
- Finding Day's response inadequate, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the petition be dismissed.
- The U.S. District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendation and dismissed the petition.
- Day appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed the district court's dismissal.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a split among the circuit courts on this issue.
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Issue:
Does a federal district court have the authority to dismiss a habeas corpus petition as untimely on its own initiative after the State has filed an answer conceding the petition's timeliness?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice Ginsburg
Yes, a federal court has the authority to dismiss a habeas petition as untimely on its own initiative, even after the State has answered without contesting its timeliness. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's (AEDPA) one-year statute of limitations is a non-jurisdictional affirmative defense, but it is akin to other threshold defenses like exhaustion of state remedies and procedural default, which courts may raise sua sponte to protect systemic interests in comity, finality, and judicial efficiency. In this case, the State's concession of timeliness was not an intelligent waiver of the defense but an evident miscalculation. A court that detects such a clear computation error is not required to ignore it. However, before dismissing a petition on its own initiative, a court must provide the petitioner with fair notice and an opportunity to be heard on the timeliness issue.
Dissenting - Justice Stevens
This opinion does not disagree with the majority's answer to the legal question presented but dissents from the Court's entry of judgment. The Court should postpone its final judgment pending the decision in another case, Lawrence v. Florida, which was set to decide a key issue regarding the time calculation that determined whether Day's petition was, in fact, untimely. Affirming the dismissal before deciding Lawrence created a risk of a miscarriage of justice if that subsequent decision proved Day's petition was actually timely.
Dissenting - Justice Scalia
No, a federal court lacks the authority to dismiss a habeas petition as untimely on its own initiative after the State has answered. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern habeas proceedings unless inconsistent, and under Rule 8(c), a statute of limitations defense is forfeited if not raised in the answer. AEDPA's time bar is a standard statute of limitations, not a court-created equitable doctrine like exhaustion or procedural default that implicates comity. The proper procedure, if a judge notices an error, is to inform the State and allow it to seek leave to amend its answer under Rule 15(a), not for the court to take over the State's role in the adversarial process.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies a district court's role as an active gatekeeper in habeas corpus litigation, prioritizing the finality and efficiency goals of AEDPA over strict adherence to traditional adversarial principles where a defense not pleaded is waived. By aligning the AEDPA statute of limitations with other non-jurisdictional but systemically important defenses like exhaustion and procedural default, the Court empowers judges to enforce the time bar even when the state fails to do so. This creates a notable exception to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the habeas context and will likely lead to more sua sponte dismissals, while also requiring courts to carefully distinguish between a state's inadvertent error and a deliberate waiver of the defense.
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