Yes, the neighbor might have to pay. The court said that normally, you have to actually agree to a deal. But here, the neighbor saw valuable work being done for his property, knew the builder expected to be paid, and had a chance to say 'Hey, stop, I'm not paying for that!' By staying quiet and letting the work happen, he acted like he agreed to the deal. It's like saying 'yes' without using words. It's up to a jury to look at all the facts and decide if the neighbor's silence really meant he agreed to pay.

Yes, Mr. Caton might have to pay even though he didn't say he would. Just because Mr. Day thought he would get paid doesn't mean there was a definite agreement. But, since Mr. Caton knew about the work and didn't tell Mr. Day to stop or that he wouldn't pay, it's like he agreed to the work and to pay for it. Mr. Caton could have said no to the work, but by staying quiet, he kind of said yes. There's a rule that says if you stay quiet when you should speak up, it's like you're agreeing. The jury had to decide if Mr. Caton's silence meant he agreed to pay Mr. Day.

<opinion type="majority"> <author id="b531-3">Devens, J.</author> . The ruling that a promise to pay for the wall would not be implied from the fact that the plaintiff, with the defendant’s knowledge, built the wall, and that the defendant used it, was substantially in accordance with the request of the defendant, and is conceded to have been correct. Chit. Con. (11th Am. ed.) 86. Wells v. Banister, 4 Mass. 514. Knowlton v. Plantation No. 4, 14 Maine, 20. Davis v. School District in Bradford, 24 Maine, 349. The defendant, however, contends that the presiding judge incorrectly ruled that such promise might be inferred from the fact that the plaintiff undertook and completed the building of' the wall with the expectation that the defendant would pay him for it, the defendant having reason to know that the plaintiff was acting with that expectation, and allowed him thus to act without objection. The fact that the plaintiff expected to be paid for the work would certainly not be sufficient of itself to establish the existence of a contract, when the question between the parties was whether one was made. Taft v. Dickinson, 6 Allen, 553. It must be shown that, in some manner, the party sought to be charged assented to it. If a party, however, voluntarily accepts and avails himself of valuable services rendered for his benefit, when he has the option whether to accept or reject them, even if there is no distinct proof that they were rendered by his authority or request, a promise to pay for them may be inferred. His knowledge that they were valuable, and his exercise of the option, to avail himself of them, justify this inference. Abbot v. Hermon, 7 Greenl. 118. Hayden v. Madison, 7 Greenl. 76. And when one stands by in silence and sees valuable services rendered upon his real estate by the erection of a structure, (of which he must necessarily avail himself afterwards in his proper use thereof,) such silence, accompanied with the knowledge on his part that the party rendering the services expects payment therefor, may fairly be treated as evidence of an acceptance of it, and as tending to show an agreement to pay for it. The maxim, Qui tacet consentire videtur, is to be construed indeed as applying only to those cases where the circumstances are such that a party is fairly called upon either to deny or admit his liability. But if silence may be interpreted as assent where a <page-number citation-index="1" label="516">*516</page-number>proposition is made to one which he is bound to deny or admit, so also it may be if he is silent in the face of facts which fairly call upon him to speak. Lamb v. Bunce, 4 M. &amp; S. 275. Conner v. Hackley, 2 Met. 613. Preston v. American Linen Co. ante, 400. If a person saw day after day a laborer at work in his field doing services, which must of necessity enure to his benefit, knowing that the laborer expected pay for his work, when it was perfectly easy to notify him if his services were not wanted, even if a request were not expressly proved, such a request, either previous to or contemporaneous with the performance of the services, might fairly be inferred. But if the fact was merely brought to his attention upon a single occasion and casually,, if he had little opportunity to hotify the other that he did not desire the work and should not pay for it, or could only do so at the expense of much time and trouble, the same inference might not be made. The circumstances of each case would necessarily determine whether silence with a knowledge that another was doing valuable work for his benefit, and with the expectation of payment, indicated that consent which would give rise to the inference of a contract. The question would be one for the jury, and to them it was properly submitted in the case before us by the presiding judge. Exceptions overruled. </opinion>

Yes, a promise to pay for the wall can be legally inferred under these circumstances. While a party’s mere expectation of being paid is insufficient to create a contract, an agreement can be inferred from conduct. If a party voluntarily accepts and avails himself of valuable services when he has the option to reject them, a promise to pay can be inferred. When one stands by in silence and sees valuable services rendered upon his real estate, knowing the other party expects payment, such silence may be treated as evidence of acceptance. The maxim 'Qui tacet consentire videtur' (he who is silent is seen to consent) applies where circumstances are such that a party is fairly called upon to speak. The determination depends on the specific circumstances of the case, such as whether the party had a genuine opportunity to object, and is ultimately a question for the jury.

Yes, a promise to pay can be implied in these circumstances. While Day's expectation of payment alone is not enough to establish a contract, Caton's knowledge of the services and his silence in the face of Day's expectation can be interpreted as assent to the services and an agreement to pay for them. This is because Caton had the option to accept or reject the services, and by allowing Day to proceed without objection, he effectively accepted the services. The maxim 'Qui tacet consentire videtur' (silence implies consent) applies here, as Caton's silence when he should have spoken up can be taken as consent. The jury was correctly tasked with determining whether Caton's conduct indicated an implied agreement to pay for the services rendered.

Day v. Caton

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