Dawn Warrick and Nathan Parrish v. Steve and Mitzi Stewart
29 N.E.3d 1284, 2015 WL 1943985, 2015 Ind. App. LEXIS 371 (2015)
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Rule of Law:
A trial court does not abuse its discretion in granting a new trial and setting aside a jury's verdict as against the weight of the evidence if its decision is supported by specific findings of fact that demonstrate a careful review of the evidence, applying the 'thirteenth juror' standard.
Facts:
- On October 11, 2010, Steve Stewart was driving his motorcycle east on Chicago Street in Columbia City, Indiana, after stopping at a red light and turning left.
- Stewart slowed down after noticing a pickup truck beginning to exit a gas station onto Chicago Street, concerned it might pull out in front of him.
- Seconds later, a dog darted into the street from behind a small concrete wall and collided with Stewart’s motorcycle, causing him to lose control, crash, and suffer injuries; Stewart never saw the dog.
- Nathan Parrish had let Dawn Warrick’s dog and another dog outside on staked cables in the backyard of the Chicago Street home he shared with Dawn Warrick.
- Dawn Warrick’s dog had slipped out of its collar, which remained clasped to the staked cable, and was at large in the city limits in violation of a city ordinance.
- Dawn Warrick admitted the dog was not properly restrained, and a dog training expert testified that the collar must have been improperly fitted for the dog to slip it.
Procedural Posture:
- Steve and Mitzi Stewart filed a negligence claim against Dawn Warrick and Nathan Parrish in Whitley Circuit Court (trial court) on November 30, 2011.
- A two-day jury trial concluded on May 14, 2014, with the jury assigning 70% fault to Stewart and 30% fault to the Warricks.
- The trial court entered judgment in favor of the Warricks because Stewart was found more than 50% at fault under comparative fault rules.
- Stewart filed a motion to correct error.
- On June 25, 2014, the trial court granted Stewart’s motion to correct error, setting aside the jury’s verdict as against the weight of the evidence, and ordered a new trial.
- Dawn Warrick and Nathan Parrish (Appellant-Defendants) appealed the trial court’s decision to the Court of Appeals of Indiana.
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Issue:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by granting Stewart’s motion to correct error, setting aside the jury’s verdict as against the weight of the evidence, and ordering a new trial?
Opinions:
Majority - Bailey, J.
No, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted Stewart’s motion to correct error, set aside the jury’s verdict as against the weight of the evidence, and ordered a new trial. The Court of Appeals found that the trial court's decision was entitled to a strong presumption of correctness because it was supported by specific findings as required by Trial Rule 59(J). The trial court, acting as a 'thirteenth juror,' has an affirmative duty to weigh conflicting evidence and assess witness credibility, determining whether a contrary verdict should have been reached by reasonable persons. Here, the trial court properly weighed the evidence regarding Stewart’s speed and lookout, finding that there was testimonial evidence Stewart was not speeding and that the motorcycle's slide distance did not equate to fault without further evidence. The court acknowledged potential minor inconsistencies in Stewart’s testimony regarding distractions but concluded that these discrepancies could not rationally support a finding that Stewart was 70% at fault, especially given the ample evidence of the Warricks' negligence in restraining the dog. The appellate court affirmed that the trial court's findings were not inconsistent and that merely giving a comparative fault instruction did not preclude the court from later finding the verdict against the weight of the evidence on a motion to correct error.
Concurring - Riley, J.
Justice Riley concurred in the majority opinion.
Concurring - Barnes, J.
Justice Barnes concurred in the majority opinion.
Analysis:
This case strongly affirms the significant role of the trial court as a 'thirteenth juror' in Indiana, underscoring its authority to set aside a jury verdict that it finds to be against the weight of the evidence. It emphasizes that appellate courts afford substantial deference to such decisions, provided the trial court complies with Trial Rule 59(J)'s requirement for specific findings. The ruling clarifies that presenting a comparative fault instruction to the jury does not prevent a plaintiff from later challenging the jury's fault allocation through a motion to correct error, reinforcing the avenues available for seeking judicial review of jury decisions. This reinforces judicial oversight to correct potentially irrational jury outcomes.
