Dawn D. v. Superior Court
952 P.2d 1139, 17 Cal.4th 932, 98 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2511 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
An alleged biological father who has no existing personal relationship with a child born to a woman who is married to another man does not have a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause to establish his paternity. Therefore, a state statute that presumes the mother's husband is the father and denies standing to the alleged biological father is constitutional.
Facts:
- Dawn D. and Frank F. were married in June 1989.
- In January 1995, Dawn separated from Frank and began living with Jerry K.
- Dawn became pregnant in February 1995 while living with Jerry.
- In April 1995, Dawn reconciled with her husband Frank and moved back in with him.
- In anticipation of fatherhood, Jerry completed a parenting course.
- Dawn gave birth to a son on November 9, 1995.
- The child has resided exclusively with Dawn and Frank since birth.
- Jerry attempted to negotiate an agreement for child support and visitation with Dawn and Frank.
Procedural Posture:
- Jerry K. filed a complaint in the Superior Court of Riverside County (trial court) to establish a parental relationship with the unborn child of Dawn D.
- Dawn D. moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing Jerry K. lacked standing under California's Uniform Parentage Act because her husband, Frank F., was the presumed father.
- The trial court denied Dawn D.'s motion and granted Jerry K.'s motion for blood testing, finding he had established a due process right.
- Dawn D. (petitioner) petitioned the Court of Appeal for a writ of mandate to compel the trial court to grant her motion for judgment on the pleadings.
- The Court of Appeal summarily denied the petition.
- The California Supreme Court granted Dawn D.'s petition for review.
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Issue:
Does an alleged biological father who has no existing relationship with a child born to a married woman have a constitutionally protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause that allows him to challenge the legal presumption that the mother's husband is the father?
Opinions:
Majority - Werdegar, J.
No. An alleged biological father's interest in establishing a relationship with a child born to a woman married to another man is not a fundamental liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. The court reasoned that under the framework established in U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, particularly Michael H. v. Gerald D., a mere biological link, without an existing parent-child relationship, is insufficient to create a constitutionally protected liberty interest that would override the state's interest in preserving the integrity of the marital family. The court distinguished this situation from cases like Adoption of Kelsey S., which involved children born to unwed parents, where the state's interest in protecting an existing marital family is not present. Therefore, California's statutory scheme, which presumes the husband is the father and denies standing to outsiders like Jerry, does not violate substantive due process.
Dissenting - Chin, J.
Yes. A biological father who promptly comes forward and demonstrates a full commitment to his parental responsibilities has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the opportunity to develop a relationship with his child, regardless of the mother's marital status. The dissent argued that the majority misinterprets Michael H. v. Gerald D. and ignores this court's precedent in Adoption of Kelsey S., which recognized a biological father's 'opportunity interest.' The proper due process analysis requires balancing the father's interest against the state's interests, which cannot be accomplished by a statute that completely denies the father any opportunity for a hearing. The mother's marital status is a factor to be considered in a hearing about the child's best interests, not a basis for denying a hearing altogether.
Concurring - Kennard, J.
No. The concurring opinion fully agrees with the majority's conclusion and writes separately to emphasize that history and tradition provide additional strong support for the decision. For centuries, the law has recognized a powerful presumption of legitimacy for children born in wedlock, consistently denying men outside the marriage the right to challenge paternity. This historical legal tradition reinforces the conclusion that the interest asserted by the alleged biological father is not a fundamental liberty right deeply rooted in the nation's history. The interest at stake is fundamentally different from that in adoption cases involving unwed mothers, where the common law recognized some paternal rights if the mother relinquished her own.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the state's strong interest in protecting the integrity and stability of the marital family unit. It establishes a clear legal distinction in California between the rights of unwed fathers of children born to single mothers and the rights of alleged biological fathers of children born into an intact marriage. By following the reasoning of the plurality in Michael H. v. Gerald D., the court prioritizes the legal family over a mere biological connection, thereby limiting the scope of the 'opportunity interest' recognized in prior cases like Adoption of Kelsey S. The mother's marital status becomes a critical threshold factor in determining whether an alleged biological father has any constitutionally protected rights.
