Davis v. White (In Re White)
8 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1093, 1982 Bankr. LEXIS 4631, 18 B.R. 246 (1982)
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Rule of Law:
Under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), a debt for an injury is non-dischargeable as a "willful and malicious injury" even if the victim was not the intended target, because the common law doctrine of transferred intent applies.
Facts:
- Walter Calvin White, Jr. was in an ongoing argument with William Tipton.
- In anticipation of a future confrontation with Tipton, White obtained a handgun.
- During a subsequent argument, White drew the handgun.
- As Tipton fled on his motorcycle, White intentionally fired the gun at him.
- The bullet missed Tipton and struck Ralph Edward Davis, an uninvolved bystander who was washing a car nearly a block away.
- White and Davis did not know each other before the shooting.
Procedural Posture:
- Ralph Edward Davis obtained a $50,000 default judgment against Walter Calvin White, Jr. in the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond.
- White subsequently filed a petition for bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court.
- Davis filed a Complaint in the bankruptcy proceeding, asking the court to declare the $50,000 judgment a non-dischargeable debt.
- The U.S. Bankruptcy Court held a trial on the dischargeability complaint.
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Issue:
Does a debt for an injury to an unintended victim qualify as a 'willful and malicious injury' under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6), making it non-dischargeable in bankruptcy, when the debtor intentionally tried to harm a third party?
Opinions:
Majority - Blackwell N. Shelley
Yes. A debt for an injury to an unintended victim is a non-dischargeable 'willful and malicious injury' because the debtor's intent to harm the intended victim transfers to the actual victim. For a debt to be non-dischargeable under § 523(a)(6), the injury must be 'willful,' meaning deliberate or intentional, not merely reckless. Here, the court found White's act of shooting the gun was intentional, not accidental as he claimed. The court then applied the doctrine of transferred intent, as recognized in both general tort law and Virginia precedent, which holds that a person who intends to commit a battery is liable for the battery even if they strike a stranger instead of the intended victim. Because White committed an intentional, wrongful act (shooting at Tipton) without just cause, his malicious intent transfers to the resulting injury to Davis, making the debt non-dischargeable.
Analysis:
This case clarifies the scope of 'willful and malicious injury' for bankruptcy discharge purposes by formally incorporating the tort law doctrine of transferred intent. The decision establishes that the focus of the § 523(a)(6) inquiry is on the nature of the debtor's conduct—whether it was intentional and wrongful—rather than on the identity of the specific victim. This prevents debtors from escaping liability for intentional torts through bankruptcy simply because their harmful act had an unintended consequence or victim. It solidifies the principle that a debtor is responsible for all natural and probable consequences of their intentional, wrongful acts.
