Davis v. United States
417 U.S. 333 (1974)
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Rule of Law:
A federal prisoner's claim that an intervening change in the law establishes their conviction was for an act that the law does not make criminal is cognizable in a collateral proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, as this constitutes a fundamental defect resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice.
Facts:
- In February 1965, Joseph Anthony Davis was classified I-A by his draft board and ordered to report for a pre-induction physical examination.
- Davis failed to appear for the physical and later failed to keep his draft board apprised of his correct mailing address, causing the board's communications to be returned as undeliverable.
- After multiple failed attempts to contact him, the local board declared Davis a delinquent for both his failure to report for the physical and his failure to provide a current address.
- Based on his delinquent status, the board issued an order for Davis to report for induction into the Armed Forces, bypassing the standard requirement that a registrant first be found acceptable for service.
- The board sent a second order to report for induction to a different address Davis had used.
- Davis received the second induction order but again failed to report as ordered.
Procedural Posture:
- Joseph Anthony Davis was prosecuted and convicted in a U.S. District Court for failure to report for induction.
- Davis appealed his conviction to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
- While the appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Gutknecht v. United States, leading the Court of Appeals to remand Davis's case to the District Court for reconsideration.
- On remand, the District Court reaffirmed the conviction, finding that Davis’s induction had not been accelerated.
- Davis appealed again, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court's decision.
- The U.S. Supreme Court denied Davis's petition for a writ of certiorari.
- Davis later filed a motion in the sentencing U.S. District Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his sentence, arguing that a subsequent Ninth Circuit case, United States v. Fox, constituted an intervening change in law favorable to his claim.
- The District Court denied the § 2255 motion.
- The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that its prior decision on direct appeal was the 'law of the case' and barred the collateral attack.
- The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' judgment on the § 2255 motion.
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Issue:
Does a federal prisoner's claim, based on an intervening court of appeals decision, that his conviction was for an act that the law does not make criminal, state a cognizable claim for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 even if the claim is not of constitutional dimension?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Justice Stewart
Yes. A federal prisoner's claim that an intervening change in law shows he was convicted for an act that the law does not make criminal is cognizable in a § 2255 proceeding. The Court of Appeals erred in holding that the 'law of the case' doctrine precluded Davis's claim, as an intervening change in law is a recognized basis for a new hearing. The scope of relief under § 2255 is intended to be as broad as federal habeas corpus, which covers claims of custody 'in violation of the... laws of the United States.' While not every error of law is remediable on collateral attack, an error that constitutes 'a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice' is. A conviction for an act that the law does not make criminal is such a fundamental defect, presenting exceptional circumstances that justify collateral relief.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice Rehnquist
No. Davis's claim should not be cognizable under § 2255. The operative language of § 2255 limits relief to jurisdictional defects, unauthorized sentences, or infringements of constitutional rights, not general violations of federal 'laws.' The 'law' Davis relies on is a conflicting panel decision from the same circuit, which is not what Congress intended by 'laws of the United States' for the purpose of collateral attack. This decision unjustifiably expands collateral review beyond its traditional constitutional and jurisdictional bounds, undermining the finality of criminal judgments and threatening to overburden the federal courts with relitigation of non-constitutional claims whenever an appellate court modifies its interpretation of a statute.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Mr. Justice Powell
Yes. Review under § 2255 is available to the petitioner due to the intervening change in the law of the Circuit. However, the Court should decide the merits of the underlying claim and affirm the conviction. The Supreme Court's decision in Gutknecht v. United States invalidated the delinquency regulations only when they were applied punitively to accelerate a registrant's induction. In this case, Davis's induction was delayed, not accelerated, due to his own evasive actions. The board's use of the delinquency procedure was a reasonable way to deal with a recalcitrant registrant, not a punitive measure, and thus Davis's induction order was valid.
Analysis:
This decision significantly clarifies the scope of collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, confirming that it extends beyond purely constitutional or jurisdictional claims. It establishes that a fundamental, non-constitutional error of law, such as a conviction for conduct that a subsequent binding legal interpretation reveals was not criminal, can be grounds for vacating a sentence. The ruling tempers the principle of finality by allowing convictions to be reopened based on intervening changes in statutory interpretation within a circuit, potentially increasing the volume of collateral attacks but ensuring a mechanism exists to correct 'a complete miscarriage of justice.'
