Davis v. State
207 So. 3d 142 (2016)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
The dying declaration exception to the hearsay rule remains a valid, historically-grounded exception to the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, even for testimonial statements, provided the declarant made the statement while believing their death was imminent and the statement concerned the cause or circumstances of that impending death.
Facts:
- Facing financial difficulties, Leon Davis, Jr. (Davis) planned to rob the Headley Insurance Agency, a business where he had previously been a client.
- On December 7, 2007, six days before the robbery, Davis purchased a .357 magnum revolver from his cousin.
- On the morning of December 13, 2007, Davis purchased items including a cooler, gloves, and a cigarette lighter from a Walmart.
- Around 3:00 p.m. that day, Davis entered the Headley Insurance Agency, locked the door, and demanded money from employees Yvonne Bustamante and Juanita Luciano.
- After stealing about $900, Davis bound both women with duct tape, poured gasoline on them, and set them on fire.
- As Bustamante and Luciano escaped the burning building, Davis shot Bustamante in her left hand.
- A bystander, Brandon Greisman, who attempted to help the victims, was shot in the face by Davis.
- Before dying from her injuries five days later, Bustamante, suffering from burns over 80-90% of her body, identified Davis by name to law enforcement and told a bystander, "I'm not going to make this."
Procedural Posture:
- Leon Davis, Jr. was tried in the Circuit Court for Polk County, Florida (a state trial court) for three counts of first-degree murder, attempted murder, armed robbery, and arson.
- Before trial, the defendant Davis filed a motion to exclude victim Yvonne Bustamante's statements identifying him.
- The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion, ruling the statements were admissible as a dying declaration.
- On February 15, 2011, a jury convicted Davis on all counts.
- Following the penalty phase, the jury recommended death sentences for the murders of Yvonne Bustamante and Juanita Luciano (unanimously) and for the murder of baby Michael (by an 8-4 vote).
- The trial court sentenced Davis to death for the murders of Bustamante and Luciano, but overrode the jury’s recommendation for baby Michael and imposed a life sentence for that murder.
- Davis (as appellant) filed a direct appeal of his convictions and two death sentences to the Supreme Court of Florida (the state's highest court), which has automatic jurisdiction to review death penalty cases.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
Does the admission of a testimonial dying declaration, where the defendant had no prior opportunity for cross-examination, violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation under Crawford v. Washington?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No. The admission of a testimonial dying declaration does not violate a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confrontation because the dying declaration is a unique, historically recognized exception that survives the Supreme Court's ruling in Crawford v. Washington. The court joins the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions in holding that the exception remains viable post-Crawford, not solely on antiquated religious grounds, but also due to the necessity of preventing murder from going unpunished. The Supreme Court itself noted in Crawford that the dying declaration was a sui generis (one of a kind) historical exception. Here, Bustamante's statements were properly admitted under this exception because the totality of the circumstances—including her horrific injuries, her direct statement that she was not going to survive, and the objective medical reality of her condition—demonstrated she believed her death was imminent when she identified Davis as her attacker.
Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Perry, J.
No. This opinion concurs with the majority that Davis's convictions should be affirmed, thereby implicitly agreeing on the admissibility of the dying declaration. However, the opinion dissents from the majority's conclusion that the sentencing error under Hurst v. Florida was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The dissent argues that the majority improperly reweighed the evidence instead of focusing on the error's effect on the jury. Because the jury was not required to unanimously find each specific aggravating factor, it is impossible to know if the constitutional requirements of Hurst were met. The fact that the same jury did not unanimously recommend death for the third victim, despite similar aggravating evidence, demonstrates that the error was not harmless and that a new penalty phase is required.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies Florida's position within the majority of jurisdictions holding that the historical dying declaration exception to hearsay survives the Confrontation Clause challenge posed by Crawford v. Washington. It affirms that the exception's rationale is not solely based on antiquated religious beliefs but also on the necessity of prosecuting murder and the inherent solemnity of a final statement. The court's application of the "totality of the circumstances" test for determining the declarant's belief of impending death provides a flexible, fact-intensive standard for trial courts. This ruling ensures that crucial evidence from victims who do not survive their injuries remains admissible in homicide prosecutions, reinforcing a long-standing tool for law enforcement and prosecutors.
Unlock the full brief for Davis v. State