Davis et al. v. Scherer

Supreme Court of United States
468 U.S. 183 (1984)
ELI5:

Rule of Law:

A government official's violation of a clear state statute or regulation does not, by itself, strip the official of qualified immunity from a damages suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To overcome qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show that the official violated a clearly established federal statutory or constitutional right.


Facts:

  • Gregory Scherer, a radio-teletype operator for the Florida Highway Patrol, received permission from his commander, Capt. K. S. Sconiers, to accept a second job as a reserve deputy.
  • The letter granting permission noted it would be rescinded if the employment interfered with his Patrol duties.
  • Later that month, Capt. Sconiers revoked the permission after his superiors determined the reserve deputy duties could conflict with Scherer's primary job.
  • Scherer continued to work at the second job despite the revocation and multiple orders from his superiors to quit.
  • Scherer and his superiors exchanged letters and had discussions in which Scherer explained he saw no conflict and would not quit the second job.
  • Capt. Sconiers recommended Scherer's termination to Col. J. E. Beach, the director of the Florida Highway Patrol.
  • Based on memoranda and letters from Scherer and his superiors, Col. Beach ordered the termination of Scherer's employment with the Florida Highway Patrol.

Procedural Posture:

  • After his termination, Gregory Scherer filed an appeal with the Florida Career Service Commission.
  • Before the Commission heard the appeal, Scherer and the Department of Highway Safety settled, and Scherer was reinstated with backpay.
  • Following further friction, Scherer resigned and filed a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Florida against his former superiors (appellants).
  • The District Court initially found that appellants had violated Scherer's clearly established due process rights and were therefore not entitled to qualified immunity.
  • Following a new, controlling decision from the Court of Appeals, the District Court reconsidered its ruling on motion.
  • On reconsideration, the District Court found the constitutional right was not clearly established, but still denied qualified immunity because the appellants' violation of a state personnel regulation made their conduct unreasonable.
  • The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District Court's judgment.
  • The U.S. Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified immunity.

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Issue:

Does a state official lose qualified immunity from a § 1983 damages suit for violating a federal constitutional right, which was not clearly established at the time, merely because the official's conduct also violated a clear state administrative regulation?


Opinions:

Majority - Justice Powell

No, a state official does not lose qualified immunity from a damages suit merely because his conduct violated a clear state administrative regulation, when the federal constitutional right at issue was not itself clearly established. Officials sued for constitutional violations do not lose their qualified immunity simply because their conduct also violates some other statutory or administrative provision. Under the objective reasonableness standard from Harlow v. Fitzgerald, officials are shielded from liability unless their conduct violates a clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Allowing a violation of a state regulation to defeat immunity would disrupt the balance between vindicating citizens' rights and allowing public officials to perform their duties effectively, as it would expose officials to liability for constitutional rights that were not clearly defined at the time of their actions. This would also require federal courts to interpret state administrative rules, complicating and prolonging litigation.


Concurring-in-part-and-dissenting-in-part - Justice Brennan

No, appellants should not be entitled to qualified immunity because their conduct did, in fact, violate Scherer's clearly established due process rights. The majority errs by ignoring the facts and the state of the law in 1977, which made it clear that a public employee with a property interest in their job was entitled to meaningful notice and an opportunity to be heard before termination. Scherer was never informed that his job was in jeopardy nor given a chance to respond to the official making the termination decision. Long-standing Supreme Court precedent, Fifth Circuit case law, and the Highway Patrol's own regulations established that due process required pre-termination procedures which appellants failed to provide. Therefore, under the Harlow standard, their conduct was objectively unreasonable, and they should not be granted immunity from damages.



Analysis:

This decision significantly clarifies the objective standard for qualified immunity established in Harlow v. Fitzgerald. By ruling that a violation of state law is irrelevant to the federal qualified immunity analysis, the Court prevents plaintiffs from using state regulations as a back door to defeat immunity when the underlying federal right was not clearly established. This strengthens the protection for government officials, encouraging them to act decisively without the fear of litigation based on complex or ancillary state rules. The case solidifies the principle that the immunity inquiry focuses solely and strictly on whether the specific federal constitutional or statutory right at issue was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation.

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