Davis v. Massachusetts
1897 U.S. LEXIS 2077, 167 U.S. 43, 17 S. Ct. 731 (1897)
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Rule of Law:
The government has the authority to regulate the use of public property, including speech activities, in a manner similar to a private property owner, and may require permits for public speaking in parks and on public grounds.
Facts:
- The City of Boston enacted an ordinance prohibiting any person from making a public address on public grounds without a permit from the mayor.
- The Boston Common is a public park owned by the City of Boston.
- William F. Davis, a preacher, delivered a public sermon on the Boston Common.
- Davis did not have a permit from the mayor to speak on the Common, as required by the city ordinance.
Procedural Posture:
- William F. Davis was prosecuted and convicted in a Massachusetts trial court for violating a Boston city ordinance.
- Davis appealed his conviction to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the state's highest court.
- The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the conviction.
- Davis (as plaintiff in error) then brought the case to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing the ordinance violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.
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Issue:
Does a municipal ordinance that requires individuals to obtain a permit from the mayor before making a public address on public grounds, such as the Boston Common, violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution?
Opinions:
Majority - Justice White
No, the municipal ordinance does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment. The state has the power to control and regulate the use of its public property, and it may delegate this power to municipalities. The legislature's power over public parks is akin to a private owner's power over their own property; just as a homeowner can forbid speaking in their house, the government can forbid or regulate speaking in a public park. The right to absolutely exclude individuals from using the property (the greater power) necessarily includes the lesser power to set conditions for its use, such as requiring a permit. The Fourteenth Amendment does not grant citizens a right to use public property in defiance of reasonable, non-discriminatory state regulations.
Analysis:
This case establishes an early and highly deferential view of the government's power to regulate speech on public property, treating the government as a proprietor rather than a trustee for the public. The 'greater includes the lesser' reasoning, which analogizes public land to private property, was a foundational concept in public forum doctrine. This proprietary approach was significantly curtailed in later cases like Hague v. CIO (1939), which established that streets and parks are traditional public forums where speech rights receive heightened protection, shifting the doctrine away from the government's ownership rights and towards the public's expressive rights.
