Davis v. Georgia-Pacific Corporation
1968 Ore. LEXIS 446, 251 Or. 239, 445 P.2d 481 (1968)
Rule of Law:
Airborne intrusions of fumes, gases, smoke, and odors, which invade a property owner's protected interest in exclusive possession and cause harm, can constitute a trespass, extending beyond traditional notions of direct physical invasion by tangible objects. While the social value of a defendant's conduct and efforts to prevent harm are irrelevant for determining compensatory damages in trespass, such evidence is admissible for a jury to consider when deciding punitive damages to assess the degree of aggravation.
Facts:
- Veva Davis owned a residence in the city of Toledo, Oregon.
- Georgia-Pacific Paper Company commenced the operation of a pulp and paper plant in close proximity to Veva Davis's residence.
- The plant's operation caused the emanation of vibrations, offensive odors, fumes, gases, smoke, and particulates.
- These emanations rendered Veva Davis's premises uninhabitable and caused damage to her residence and plant life.
Procedural Posture:
- Veva Davis and her husband sued Georgia-Pacific Paper Company in trial court for trespass, seeking compensatory and punitive damages.
- The trial court entered a judgment awarding Veva Davis and her husband both compensatory and punitive damages.
- Georgia-Pacific Paper Company appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of Oregon.
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Issue:
1) Does an intrusion of fumes, gases, smoke, and odors upon another's land constitute a trespass, or is it solely a nuisance? 2) Should a jury be permitted to consider the utility of a defendant's business operation and efforts to prevent harm when determining compensatory or punitive damages for trespass?
Opinions:
Majority - Holman, J.
Yes, an intrusion of fumes, gases, smoke, and odors can constitute a trespass, and a jury should not consider the utility of a defendant's conduct for compensatory damages, but should for punitive damages. The court abandoned the traditional concept that trespass requires a direct intrusion by a tangible and visible object, as established in Norwood. Citing Bedell et ux v. Goulter et al (1953), which held that vibrations and concussions could be trespass, and Martin et ux v. Reynolds Metals Co. (1960), which found invisible airborne particulates to be trespass, the court emphasized the instrumentality's energy or force rather than its size. It defined trespass as "any intrusion which invades the possessor’s protected interest in exclusive possession, whether that intrusion is by visible or invisible pieces of matter or by energy which can be measured only by the mathematical language of the physicist." Therefore, allowing the jury to consider fumes, gases, smoke, and odors as trespass was not error. The court held that in a trespass case, the social value of defendant’s conduct or efforts to prevent harm cannot be considered by the jury for compensatory damages; such 'weighing processes' are for courts to classify intrusions or determine privilege, leading to strict liability if an unprivileged trespass is found. However, for punitive damages, which aim to deter aggravated disregard of rights, it was proper for the jury to consider the utility of defendant’s operations and efforts to prevent damage. The court found that Mr. Davis, as a stranger to the title, had no protectable interest for permanent injury to the property, but his inclusion was harmless error. The court also found the admission of State Sanitary Authority documents, while containing irrelevant surplusage, was not prejudicial for compensatory damages and was not hearsay as it was not used to prove the truth of third-party claims. The court affirmed the judgment for compensatory damages in favor of Mrs. Davis only, but set aside the punitive damages verdict due to the trial court's error in excluding evidence relevant to the weighing process for punitive damages, offering a new trial option.
Concurring - O’Connell, J.
I concur in the result of setting aside punitive damages. For the reasons stated in my dissent in McElwain v. Georgia-Pacific, I believe that punitive damages should not be imposed under the circumstances of this case.
Concurring - Denecke, J.
I specially concur in that portion of the decision which holds that there was evidence from which the jury could properly award punitive damages. A majority of the court in McElwain v. Georgia-Pacific, with practically identical evidence, previously decided this issue was one for the jury, despite my personal view to the contrary.
Analysis:
This case significantly broadens the common law definition of trespass in Oregon, moving away from a strict requirement of physical, tangible intrusion to encompass intangible airborne substances. It solidifies the principle that interference with the exclusive possession of land, regardless of the intruding agent's physical form or visibility, can constitute trespass. Furthermore, the decision draws a critical distinction between the evidence admissible for compensatory versus punitive damages in trespass cases, clarifying that a defendant's social utility or preventative efforts are only relevant when assessing the degree of culpability for punitive awards, not for establishing basic liability or compensatory relief.
