Davis v. Davis
71 A.D.3d 13, 889 N.Y.S.2d 611 (2009)
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Rule of Law:
Under New York Domestic Relations Law § 170(2), a spouse's refusal to engage in social interaction, referred to as 'social abandonment,' does not constitute constructive abandonment and is not a legally cognizable ground for divorce.
Facts:
- Novel Davis and Shepherd Davis were married for 41 years and resided at the same address.
- Novel Davis alleged that Shepherd Davis refused to engage in social interaction with her.
- Specific allegations included Shepherd's refusal to celebrate Valentine's Day, Christmas, Thanksgiving, or Novel's birthday with her.
- Shepherd also allegedly refused to eat meals with Novel, attend family functions, or accompany her to movies, shopping, restaurants, and church services.
- On one occasion, Shepherd left Novel at a hospital emergency room.
- Shepherd also removed Novel's belongings from the marital bedroom and generally ignored her.
Procedural Posture:
- Novel Davis (plaintiff-wife) commenced an action for divorce against Shepherd Davis (defendant-husband) in the Supreme Court of New York, a trial-level court.
- Her complaint alleged two causes of action, including one for constructive abandonment based on a theory of 'social abandonment'.
- Shepherd Davis filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss the constructive abandonment cause of action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
- The Supreme Court granted the husband's motion and dismissed the second cause of action.
- Novel Davis (appellant) appealed the trial court's dismissal to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, Second Department, an intermediate appellate court, with Shepherd Davis as the appellee.
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Issue:
Does a spouse's refusal to engage in social interaction with the other spouse, such as celebrating holidays, eating meals together, or attending social functions, constitute 'constructive abandonment' under New York Domestic Relations Law § 170(2) and provide a ground for divorce?
Opinions:
Majority - Dillon, J.P.
No. A spouse's refusal to engage in social interaction does not constitute constructive abandonment under New York law. The statutory ground of 'abandonment' has historically been interpreted to mean either actual physical departure, a lockout from the marital home, or 'constructive abandonment,' which is narrowly defined as the unjustified and continuous refusal of one spouse to engage in sexual relations for one or more years despite repeated requests. The court reasoned that expanding this definition to include 'social abandonment' would be an improper judicial usurpation of the legislature's role. The court articulated five reasons for its holding: (1) claims of 'social abandonment' are functionally equivalent to 'irreconcilable differences' or a 'dead marriage,' which are not recognized grounds for divorce in New York; (2) the legal definition of constructive abandonment has been limited to the refusal of sexual relations for nearly half a century; (3) creating a new ground for divorce is a legislative, not a judicial, function; (4) the law affords special status and protection to marital sexual relations that it does not afford to social interaction; and (5) 'social abandonment' is an amorphous concept that would be practically impossible for courts to define and apply consistently, leading to a 'judicial quagmire.'
Analysis:
This decision firmly reinforced New York's then-status as a fault-based divorce state by refusing to judicially expand the grounds for divorce. The court's rejection of 'social abandonment' maintained a strict, narrow interpretation of constructive abandonment, limiting it exclusively to the refusal of sexual relations. This holding closed a potential pathway toward a de facto no-fault divorce system, emphasizing that any such fundamental change to matrimonial law must come from the State Legislature, not the courts. The case highlights the judiciary's deference to legislative authority in defining the grounds for dissolving a marriage.
