Davis v. Alaska
415 U.S. 308 (1974)
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Rule of Law:
A criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses to show potential bias outweighs a state's policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile witness's record of delinquency.
Facts:
- In February 1970, a large safe containing over a thousand dollars was stolen from the Polar Bar in Anchorage, Alaska.
- The safe was later found broken open near the home of Jess Straight.
- Richard Green, Straight's 16-year-old stepson, told police he had seen two men standing next to a car near where the safe was discovered.
- Green later identified a photograph of the petitioner, Davis, as one of the men he had seen.
- At the time of the burglary and his subsequent identification of Davis, Green was on probation for a juvenile delinquency adjudication for having committed two burglaries.
Procedural Posture:
- At trial in an Alaska state court, the prosecutor filed a motion for a protective order to prohibit the defense from referring to witness Richard Green's juvenile record.
- The trial court granted the motion.
- A jury convicted petitioner Davis of burglary and grand larceny.
- Davis, as the appellant, appealed his conviction to the Alaska Supreme Court.
- The Alaska Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, finding that the limited cross-examination permitted by the trial court was adequate.
- The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgment of the Alaska Supreme Court.
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Issue:
Does a state's policy of protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile offender's record violate a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights when it prevents cross-examination of a key prosecution witness to show potential bias stemming from the witness's probationary status?
Opinions:
Majority - Mr. Chief Justice Burger
Yes. A state's policy interest in protecting juvenile anonymity cannot require a defendant to yield the vital constitutional right to effective cross-examination for bias. The Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause guarantees a defendant the right to cross-examine a witness to expose potential biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives. In this case, Davis was denied the right of effective cross-examination because he was unable to show that the key witness, Richard Green, might have been biased due to his vulnerable status as a probationer. The defense theory—that Green may have identified Davis out of fear of having his own probation revoked or to shift suspicion away from himself—was a crucial line of inquiry that the jury was entitled to hear to make an informed judgment about Green's credibility. Preventing this inquiry was a constitutional error of the first magnitude that outweighed the state's interest in the confidentiality of Green's juvenile record.
Concurring - Mr. Justice Stewart
Yes. I join the Court's opinion but emphasize that its holding is narrow. The Constitution conferred a right to cross-examine the witness about his juvenile adjudication in this specific case solely to show the existence of possible bias and prejudice. The Court's decision does not hold or suggest that the Constitution confers a general right in every case to impeach a witness's credibility by cross-examining them about past delinquency adjudications or criminal convictions.
Dissenting - Mr. Justice White
No. There is no constitutional principle at stake; this is a typical instance of a trial court exercising its discretion to limit cross-examination. The Alaska Supreme Court reviewed the trial record and concluded that the defense had been able to adequately question the witness about bias and that no substantial harm was done. The Court should not be second-guessing the fact-bound judgments of state trial and appellate courts, which are in a better position to assess such matters.
Analysis:
This decision firmly establishes that a defendant's specific Sixth Amendment right to impeach a witness for bias is paramount to a state's general policy of protecting juvenile anonymity. It clarifies that the right of confrontation is not merely about facing a witness, but about having the tools for an effective cross-examination to challenge the witness's credibility. The ruling significantly impacts cases relying on testimony from witnesses with juvenile records or who are otherwise in a vulnerable position with the state (e.g., on probation or parole), ensuring that defendants can explore potential motives for their testimony. Future courts must balance these competing interests with a strong presumption in favor of the defendant's constitutional right.
