No, the police department's actions were not illegal punishment. The court decided that even if taking McCoy's gun and badge was a negative action that could discourage someone from complaining, the department had a legitimate reason. McCoy's comments about 'workplace violence' made her supervisors genuinely concerned about her safety and the safety of others. Because McCoy couldn't provide any evidence to prove that this safety concern was just a fake excuse to punish her for her original harassment complaint, her retaliation case had to be dismissed. The court also said she wasn't 'forced' to quit, because the harassment she faced wasn't bad enough to make a reasonable person feel like they had no other choice but to resign.

No, the court said the City of Shreveport did not break the law in how they treated McCoy. Telling her not to joke around at work and putting her on paid leave after she got upset and said worrying things was not bad enough to be an awful work environment or to force her to quit. Taking her gun and badge while she was on leave was not an unfair punishment for complaining under the situation, where the City had good reasons that McCoy could not prove were just excuses. So the court agreed with dismissing all of McCoy's lawsuits saying the City discriminated, retaliated, and purposely upset her. The court said that for discrimination, only really big job changes like firing count as illegal actions, and for retaliation, it depends on if it would scare a normal worker from complaining. The City just has to give a good reason for what they did, not prove it's true. McCoy has to show the City's reasons are lies to win.

"To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must establish that:(1) he participated in an activity protected by Title VII;(2) his employer took an adverse employment action against him; and (3) a causal connection exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action."

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the plaintiff must establish that she "(1) is a member of a protected group;(2) was qualified for the position at issue;(3) was discharged or suffered some adverse employment action by the employer; and (4) was replaced by someone outside [her] protected group or was treated less favorably than other similarly situated …

"Adverse employment actions include only ultimate employment decisions such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, or compensating."

Id. "If the plaintiff makes a prima facie showing, the burden then shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory reason for its employment action."

"The employer's burden is only one of production, not persuasion, and involves no credibility assessment

"If the employer meets its burden of production, the plaintiff then bears the ultimate burden of proving that the employer's proffered reason is not true but instead is a pretext for the real discriminatory or retaliatory purpose."

For Title VII discrimination claims, only "ultimate employment actions" are considered actionable adverse employment actions.

"To carry this burden, the plaintiff must rebut each nondiscriminatory or nonretaliatory reason articulated by the employer."

An adverse employment action is any action that "might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination."

No, the employer's actions do not constitute an unlawful adverse employment action under these circumstances. Even if placing McCoy on paid administrative leave was an adverse action under the broad standard for retaliation claims, her claim fails because she did not prove that the City's legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons were a pretext for retaliation. The court first determined McCoy was not constructively discharged because her working conditions were not so intolerable that a reasonable person would feel compelled to resign, and Sergeant Jackson's behavior was not 'severe or pervasive' enough to create a hostile work environment. Regarding the retaliation claim, the court acknowledged that under *Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White*, the standard for an adverse action in a retaliation claim is broader than in a discrimination claim, asking only if the action 'might well have dissuaded a reasonable worker' from complaining. While taking an officer's gun and badge and placing her on administrative leave could meet this test, the court found it unnecessary to decide because the claim failed at the next stage of the *McDonnell Douglas* analysis. The City proffered legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for its actions: namely, McCoy's statements about 'workplace violence' created a legitimate safety concern that justified confiscating her weapon and placing her on leave. McCoy failed to provide any evidence, beyond the timing of the events, to show these reasons were pretextual. Therefore, her retaliation claim could not survive summary judgment.

No. The court found that the actions taken by the City of Shreveport, including counseling against workplace horseplay and placing McCoy on administrative leave after her emotional reaction and concerning statements, were not severe or pervasive enough to constitute a hostile work environment or a constructive discharge. The retrieval of McCoy's gun and badge and the placement on paid administrative leave were not considered adverse employment actions under the circumstances, where the City had legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for its actions that McCoy failed to rebut as pretextual. Therefore, the district court's summary judgment dismissing each of McCoy's Title VII discrimination and retaliation claims, as well as her state law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, is affirmed. The court emphasized that for discrimination claims, only ultimate employment decisions are actionable adverse actions, and for retaliation claims post-Burlington Northern, context matters in determining whether an action might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making a charge. The employer's burden is one of production, not persuasion, without a credibility assessment. The plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving the employer's reason is a pretext.

McCoy v. City of Shreveport

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