Davidson v. City of Westminster
649 P.2d 894, 32 Cal.3d 197, 185 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1982)
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Rule of Law:
A "special relationship" creating a duty of care for police officers to warn or protect an individual from harm by a third party does not arise from mere foreseeability of danger, but requires either that the officers' actions created or increased the risk, or induced specific reliance by the victim.
Facts:
- On three prior occasions, women had been stabbed at or near a particular public laundromat in Westminster.
- The evening before Yolanda Davidson's stabbing, police officers conducted surveillance of the laundromat, during which another stabbing occurred; the officers chased the suspect but failed to apprehend him.
- The next evening, Officers Varner and Rosenwirth had the laundromat under renewed surveillance for the purpose of preventing assaults and apprehending the felon.
- Officers Varner and Rosenwirth were aware of Yolanda Davidson's presence in the laundromat throughout their surveillance.
- After about an hour of surveillance, the officers observed a man, Jack Blackmun, who closely resembled the attacker from the previous evening, and after 15 minutes of observation, identified him as the likely perpetrator.
- During the officers' observation, Jack Blackmun entered and left the laundromat "several times."
- The officers did not warn Yolanda Davidson of the identified suspect's presence or the potential danger.
- Eventually, Yolanda Davidson was stabbed four times by Jack Blackmun while in the laundromat.
Procedural Posture:
- Yolanda Davidson and her husband filed a complaint against the City of Westminster and Police Officers Varner and Rosenwirth in the trial court (court of first instance), alleging negligence (failure to protect, warn, investigate) and intentional/negligent infliction of emotional distress.
- Defendants filed a general demurrer, contending that no "special relationship" giving rise to a duty of care existed and that the action was barred under immunity provisions of Government Code section 845.
- The trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend.
- Plaintiffs elected not to amend their complaint.
- A judgment of dismissal was entered in favor of the defendants.
- Plaintiffs appealed from the judgment of dismissal to the California Supreme Court (highest court).
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Issue:
Does a "special relationship" exist between police officers and a potential victim, or between officers and a known assailant, sufficient to impose a duty of care on the officers to warn or protect the victim from the assailant, thereby establishing liability for negligence or intentional infliction of emotional distress, when officers conduct surveillance of the assailant and victim but do not intervene before an attack?
Opinions:
Majority - Kaus, J.
No, a special relationship imposing a duty of care did not exist between the police officers and Yolanda Davidson, nor between the officers and the assailant, such that the officers would be liable for negligence or intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court first clarified that the question of "duty" (special relationship) must be determined before considering statutory immunity. The general rule is that one owes no duty to control the conduct of another or to warn those endangered by such conduct, unless a "special relation" exists as defined by the Restatement Second of Torts Section 315. Regarding a special relationship between the officers and the assailant, the court found that a person's mere proximity to an assailant, even with knowledge of his assaultive tendencies or felon status, and a visual identification from a distance, is insufficient to impose a duty to control the assailant's conduct. Regarding a special relationship between Yolanda and the officers, the court distinguished previous cases where a duty was found. In Johnson v. State of California, the state placed the victim in danger by placing a dangerous parolee in her home without warning. In Mann v. State of California, a highway patrolman stopped to assist stalled motorists, thereby lulling them into a false sense of security, and then departing without warning or placing protective flares, thus increasing or changing the risk. In contrast, the officers in this case were not responsible for the presence of either Yolanda or Blackmun in the laundromat. Yolanda was unaware of the officers' presence and did not rely on them for protection, and their conduct did not change the risk which would have existed in their absence. The court reasoned that imposing a duty to warn based on mere knowledge of danger for a potential victim and potential assailant, without more, would lead to problematic public policy consequences, potentially paralyzing a neighborhood with warnings and hindering police operations. Foreseeability of harm alone does not suffice to establish such a special relationship. For the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court found no allegation that the officers acted with the purpose of causing emotional injury to Yolanda. The complaint alleged the surveillance was conducted "for the particular purpose of preventing further assaults" and "apprehending the perpetrator." The officers' inaction, even if representing poor police procedure, did not rise to the level of "extreme and outrageous conduct" intended to inflict injury or engaged in with reckless disregard that injury would result, as required for the tort.
Analysis:
This case significantly clarifies the parameters of the "special relationship" doctrine as it applies to police liability for failing to protect the public. It establishes that police officers generally do not owe a duty of care to individual members of the public simply because they are aware of a general danger or even a specific potential victim, unless their actions actively create or increase the danger, or induce specific reliance from the victim. The decision underscores the judiciary's reluctance to impose broad tort liability on police for nonfeasance, citing public policy concerns about hamstringing law enforcement and creating an unmanageable burden. This ruling limits the scope of negligence claims against public entities and employees, forcing plaintiffs to demonstrate a more direct and affirmative link between police conduct and the harm suffered beyond mere observation or generalized efforts to prevent crime.
