David Brasse v. State
2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 9996, 2012 WL 6028960, 392 S.W.3d 239 (2012)
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Rule of Law:
For a conviction of manslaughter by omission, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was subjectively aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death and consciously disregarded it. Evidence that a defendant merely should have been aware of the risk supports a finding of criminal negligence, not the criminal recklessness required for manslaughter.
Facts:
- Eight-year-old Sarah Brasse complained of a stomach ache to the school nurse, who sent her home from school.
- Sarah's stepmother, Samantha Amity Britain, picked her up from school and took her home.
- That evening, Sarah began vomiting; her brother heard her vomit three times.
- Sarah's father, David Brasse, was aware that Sarah had a stomach ache and had vomited before he left for work at 4:30 a.m. the next morning.
- Sarah stayed home from school with her stepmother the next day, where she continued to vomit but also drank fluids.
- There is no evidence that Brasse was informed of any change in Sarah's condition after he left for work.
- Later that day, Sarah's brother checked on her, and she died shortly thereafter from complications of appendicitis.
Procedural Posture:
- David Neil Brasse was indicted in a Texas trial court on one count of manslaughter and one count of injury to a child.
- At trial, the court granted an instructed verdict of not guilty on parts of the injury to a child charge.
- The jury returned a guilty verdict on manslaughter and on one paragraph of injury to a child.
- The trial court granted Brasse's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the injury to a child conviction but denied the motion as to the manslaughter conviction.
- Brasse (appellant) appealed his manslaughter conviction to the Texas Court of Appeals, arguing the evidence was legally insufficient.
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Issue:
Is the evidence that a father knew his child had a stomach ache and had vomited legally sufficient to prove he was subjectively aware of and consciously disregarded a substantial and unjustifiable risk of her death, as required to sustain a conviction for manslaughter?
Opinions:
Majority - Simmons, J.
No. The evidence is legally insufficient to prove Brasse acted with the criminal recklessness required for a manslaughter conviction. To prove recklessness, the State must show the defendant had a subjective and actual awareness of a substantial and unjustifiable risk and consciously disregarded it. The State argued that Brasse should have known his failure to seek medical care for Sarah created a risk of her death, but this is the standard for criminal negligence, not recklessness. The evidence only established that when Brasse left for work, he knew Sarah had a stomach ache and had vomited, which is insufficient for a rational jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that he was actually aware she was at risk of dying.
Analysis:
This decision reinforces the critical distinction between the mental states of criminal recklessness and criminal negligence under Texas law. By overturning the conviction, the court emphasized that recklessness requires proof of a defendant's actual, subjective awareness of a risk, not just what an ordinary person should have known. This ruling raises the evidentiary bar for prosecutors in omission-based homicide cases, particularly those involving parental care, requiring concrete evidence of the parent's subjective knowledge of a life-threatening danger rather than allowing a jury to infer it from the circumstances of a seemingly common illness.
