Davenport v. Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Property Regime
508 S.E.2d 565 (1998)
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Rule of Law:
Under South Carolina's modified comparative negligence system, the doctrine of secondary implied assumption of risk is no longer a complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery. Instead, the plaintiff's conduct in assuming the risk is a factor to be considered by the jury in apportioning fault, and the plaintiff is barred from recovery only if their degree of fault is greater than the defendant's negligence.
Facts:
- Alvin Davenport leased a third-floor condominium unit at Cotton Hope Plantation.
- Cotton Hope Plantation Horizontal Regime ('Cotton Hope') was responsible for maintaining the common areas, including the stairways.
- Beginning in June 1991, Davenport repeatedly reported that the floodlights at the bottom of the stairway nearest his apartment were not working.
- For approximately two months, Davenport continued to use the unlit stairway despite his knowledge of the broken floodlights.
- On the evening of August 12, 1991, Davenport fell while descending the dark stairway.
- Davenport testified that he fell after mistaking a shadow for a step due to the lack of light.
- Davenport admitted that he was not using the handrail at the time of his fall.
Procedural Posture:
- Alvin Davenport sued Cotton Hope for personal injuries in the state trial court.
- Cotton Hope filed a third-party claim against Carson Landscaping Company for indemnification.
- At the close of evidence, the trial court granted a directed verdict against Davenport, finding he had assumed the risk of injury as a matter of law.
- Davenport appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, an intermediate appellate court.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, holding that assumption of risk had been subsumed by the adoption of comparative negligence and was no longer a complete defense.
- Cotton Hope, as petitioner, was granted a writ of certiorari by the Supreme Court of South Carolina, the state's highest court, to review the Court of Appeals' decision.
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Issue:
Does the common law doctrine of assumption of risk remain a complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery after South Carolina's adoption of a modified comparative negligence system?
Opinions:
Majority - Toal, Justice
No. The common law doctrine of assumption of risk no longer serves as a complete bar to recovery but is instead subsumed into the state's comparative negligence framework. The court reasoned that the 'all or nothing' nature of the assumption of risk defense is fundamentally incompatible with the purpose of a comparative fault system, which is to apportion damages based on the relative fault of the parties. Adhering to the old rule would thwart the system's goal of preventing a defendant who is at fault from escaping all liability while a plaintiff who is less at fault bears the entire cost of the injury. The court distinguished this holding from express assumption of risk and primary implied assumption of risk, which remain unaffected because they are based on contract principles or negate the defendant's duty of care altogether. The ruling applies to secondary implied assumption of risk, where a plaintiff knowingly encounters a risk created by the defendant's negligence.
Analysis:
This landmark decision aligns South Carolina with the overwhelming majority of states that have adopted comparative negligence. By subsuming secondary implied assumption of risk into the comparative fault analysis, the court eliminated a complete, 'all or nothing' affirmative defense. This change significantly impacts tort litigation, as plaintiffs who knowingly encounter a risk are no longer automatically barred from recovery. The decision ensures that a jury, rather than a judge on a directed verdict, will typically determine the relative fault of the parties, promoting the policy of apportioning liability based on fault rather than on a plaintiff's mere knowledge of a danger.
