Daugert v. Pappas
104 Wash. 2d 254, 704 P.2d 600 (1985)
Premium Feature
Subscribe to Lexplug to listen to the Case Podcast.
Rule of Law:
In a legal malpractice action arising from an attorney's failure to perfect an appeal, the determination of proximate cause is a question of law for the judge, not a question of fact for the jury. The plaintiff must prove that but for the attorney's negligence, it is more likely than not that the client would have prevailed on appeal.
Facts:
- Black Mountain Development Company (developer) built and sold a recreation complex to Black Mountain Ranch (ranch).
- Disputes arose over alleged deficiencies in the complex, leading the parties to sign a settlement agreement.
- The agreement stipulated that both parties would be bound by the findings of an independent appraiser, the Anvil Corporation.
- Anvil concluded the problems were caused by a design defect, making the developer responsible for repairs.
- The developer disagreed with Anvil's findings and refused to correct the deficiencies as required by the settlement agreement.
- After an adverse appellate court decision in the underlying dispute, the developer instructed its attorney, John Pappas, to petition the Supreme Court for review.
- Pappas filed the petition one day late and failed to follow the proper procedure for an extension, causing the developer to lose its right to any further appeal.
Procedural Posture:
- Black Mountain Ranch sued Black Mountain Development Company in a trial court for breach of a settlement agreement.
- The trial court found in favor of the developer.
- The ranch, as appellant, appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court and ruled in favor of the ranch.
- Larry Daugert, as trustee for the developer, then sued the developer's attorney, John Pappas, in a trial court for legal malpractice.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for Daugert on the issues of duty and breach.
- A jury trial was held on the issue of proximate cause, where the jury found there was a 20% chance the Supreme Court would have reversed the underlying case, and awarded damages to Daugert.
- Pappas, as appellant, appealed the malpractice judgment to the Court of Appeals, and the case was transferred to the Supreme Court of Washington.
Premium Content
Subscribe to Lexplug to view the complete brief
You're viewing a preview with Rule of Law, Facts, and Procedural Posture
Issue:
In a legal malpractice action for failure to timely file a petition for review, is the issue of proximate cause a question of fact for the jury to be determined by a 'loss of chance' or 'substantial factor' standard?
Opinions:
Majority - Pearson, J.
No. In a legal malpractice action involving a failure to perfect an appeal, the issue of proximate cause is a question of law for the judge, and the proper standard is the 'but for' test. The trial court erred by instructing the jury to decide causation based on a 'loss of chance' or 'substantial factor' analysis. The determination of whether an appellate court would have granted review and rendered a more favorable judgment requires a legal analysis of the law and appellate rules, which is within the exclusive province of a judge. The 'loss of chance' doctrine from medical malpractice is inapplicable because, unlike a deceased patient, a malpractice client effectively gets their 'day in court' when the judge in the malpractice action reviews the merits of the lost appeal. The traditional 'but for' test is the appropriate standard, requiring the client to prove they 'more likely than not' would have obtained a better result if the attorney had not been negligent.
Analysis:
This decision solidifies the 'case-within-a-case' method for appellate legal malpractice, establishing the judge as the sole arbiter of whether a lost appeal would have succeeded. It prevents juries from speculating on complex legal questions and rejects the expansion of the 'loss of chance' and 'substantial factor' causation tests into this area of law. By requiring plaintiffs to meet the higher 'but for' standard—proving they more likely than not would have won the appeal—the ruling creates a more stringent and predictable framework for causation in such cases, potentially making them more difficult for plaintiffs to win.
Unlock the full brief for Daugert v. Pappas