Daryl O. Tyler v. Commonwealth of Virginia
PUBLISHED (2021)
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Rule of Law:
To obtain a writ of actual innocence based on non-biological evidence, a petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the new evidence was previously unavailable, could not have been discovered through the exercise of diligence, is not merely cumulative or corroborative, and is so material that no rational trier of fact would have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Facts:
- On September 29, 2016, Daryl Tyler, Carmella Rosell, Craig Berry, and Rogdrick Berry were riding together in Craig's truck.
- Rosell alleged that Tyler propositioned her for sex, and after she refused, she told Craig and Rogdrick she was uncomfortable.
- The group decided to take Tyler home, which caused Tyler to become angry and start an argument.
- During the argument, Tyler grabbed the keys from the truck's ignition.
- Rosell intervened in the physical altercation between Tyler and Craig, at which point she testified that Tyler hit her with his fists, bit her arm, and choked her with his hand on her neck, making her unable to breathe.
- After the altercation, Rosell was driven to the sheriff's office to report the assault.
- A sheriff's deputy photographed Rosell's injuries, which included bruises on her face, marks on her throat and neck, and a bite mark on her arm.
- At trial, Tyler and Craig Berry testified that a fight occurred but denied that Tyler choked or strangled Rosell; Tyler claimed any physical contact was in self-defense.
Procedural Posture:
- Daryl Tyler was convicted of misdemeanor assault and battery and felony strangulation following a bench trial in the Circuit Court of Gloucester County (trial court).
- The trial court sentenced Tyler to five years in prison for the strangulation and twelve months for the assault and battery.
- Tyler filed a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, which the trial court denied.
- Tyler, as appellant, appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals of Virginia, which denied his petition for appeal.
- Tyler, as appellant, sought further review from the Supreme Court of Virginia, which refused his appeal.
- Tyler then filed a Petition for a Writ of Actual Innocence in the Court of Appeals of Virginia, which has original jurisdiction over such petitions.
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Issue:
Is a petitioner entitled to a writ of actual innocence when the new evidence consists of an affidavit from a known eyewitness who was not subpoenaed for trial due to a lack of diligence, and whose testimony is merely cumulative of evidence already presented and rejected by the factfinder?
Opinions:
Majority - Per Curiam
No, a petitioner is not entitled to a writ of actual innocence under these circumstances. To be granted the writ, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the new evidence satisfies several statutory requirements, which Tyler failed to do. First, the court found Tyler did not demonstrate diligence in obtaining the testimony of the eyewitness, Rogdrick Berry, for the original trial. Tyler's counsel knew Rogdrick was an eyewitness and had his address but failed to even request a subpoena to compel his testimony. Second, the court determined that Rogdrick's affidavit, which stated he did not see Tyler choke Rosell, was merely cumulative and corroborative of the testimony already provided by Tyler and Craig Berry at trial, which the trial court heard and rejected. Finally, the court concluded that even when considered with the trial evidence, the new affidavit would not prove that 'no rational trier of fact' would have convicted Tyler. A rational factfinder could still credit Rosell's consistent testimony, which was supported by photographic evidence of her injuries, over the conflicting accounts.
Analysis:
This decision clarifies the high bar for obtaining a writ of actual innocence in Virginia, even after the legislature lowered the burden of proof from 'clear and convincing' to 'preponderance of the evidence.' The court's analysis reinforces a strict interpretation of the 'diligence' requirement, establishing that the failure to subpoena a known witness whose location is also known constitutes a lack of diligence. Furthermore, the case demonstrates that new evidence which merely adds another voice to a defense theory already rejected by the factfinder will be considered 'cumulative' and insufficient to overturn a conviction. The ruling effectively prevents the writ of actual innocence from being used as a tool to simply relitigate credibility determinations made at trial.
